4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor

CCA Support Program Installation Manual

Release 3.24

This edition applies to:
- IBM 4764-001

Each feature is designed to provide software support for an IBM 4764-001 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor installed into a computer running the accompanying operating system.

Changes are made periodically to the information herein; before using this publication in connection with the operation of IBM systems, please check the product Web site for an updated version of this publication.

IBM does not stock publications at the address given below. This and other publications related to the IBM 4764 Coprocessor can be obtained in PDF format from the library page at the product Web site.

Readers comments can be communicated to IBM by contacting the Crypto team at crypto@us.ibm.com.

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About this publication


You can obtain Support Program editions to use with Microsoft® Windows® Server 2003, Standard Edition (32-bit), and Novell’s SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 9 (SLES 9).

Use this manual to help with the following tasks:
- Obtain the Support Program through the Internet
- Load the software onto a host computer and into the coprocessor(s)
- Use the utilities supplied with the Support Program to:
  - Load the coprocessor function-control vector (FCV)
  - Initialize one or more coprocessors
  - Create and manage access-control data
  - Create a master key and primary key-encrypting keys (KEKs)
  - Manage key storage at the cryptographic node
  - Create node-initialization file lists to set up and configure other cryptographic nodes
- Link your application software to the CCA libraries
- Obtain guidance for security consideration in application development and operational practices

Audience

The audience for this publication includes:
- System administrators who install the software
- Security officers responsible for the coprocessor access-control system
- System programmers and application programmers who determine how the software is to be used

Organization of this publication

- Chapter 1, “Installation process overview” summarizes the installation and the operation of the CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program.
- Chapter 2, “Obtaining coprocessor hardware and software” describes how to obtain the PCI-X cryptographic coprocessor hardware and the CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program.
- Chapter 3, “Installing the Support Program” describes how to install the software onto the host computer.
- Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor” describes how to load the operating system and the CCA software into the PCI-X cryptographic coprocessor.
- Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node” describes how to use the CCA Node Management and the CCA Node Initialization utilities to set up and manage cryptographic nodes.
- Chapter 6, “Building applications to use with the CCA API” explains how to build applications for CCA, and how to link them to CCA libraries.
- Appendix A, “Initial DEFAULT-role commands” details the permissions granted to the DEFAULT role when the access-control system is initialized.
- Appendix B, “Machine-readable-log contents” details the content of the machine-readable log created by the Coprocessor Load Utility.
Appendix C, “Device driver error codes” provides error-code information that can be observed when operating the CLU utility.

Appendix D, “Master-key cloning” provides a procedure for master-key cloning.

Appendix E, “Threat considerations for a digital-signing server” addresses threats to consider when employing the IBM 4764 and the Support Program in a digital-signing application.

Appendix F, “Notices” provides legal notices.

A list of abbreviations, a glossary, and an index are included.

Related publications

The list below reflects source information regarding the PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor and commercial cryptographic applications in general.

IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor publications

For availability of these publications, check the Library page of the product Web site at http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards. From the Web site, you can download, view, and print publications available in the Adobe Acrobat** portable document format (PDF):

- IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors
- IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual
Chapter 1. Installation process overview

This chapter summarizes the installation and operation procedures discussed in this manual and provides a checklist for you to use while installing the PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor and the CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program. See Table 1-1 on page 1-2.

Summary

The IBM CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program (Support Program) consists of several components, and includes:

- Device drivers and an operating system for the PCI-X cryptographic coprocessor hardware
- Support for the IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) application program interface (API)
- A function-control vector (FCV)
- Utility applications that run on the host machine into which the coprocessor has been installed

An FCV is a signed value provided by IBM. Its use originated to enable the CCA application within the coprocessor to yield a level of cryptographic service consistent with applicable cryptographic implementation import and export regulations.

See the Linux® or Windows portions of Chapter 3, “Installing the Support Program” for the supported operating system versions and prerequisite software.

To install these components and to establish a CCA cryptographic node, perform the following steps described in this manual:

1. **Obtain the hardware and software**: Chapter 2, “Obtaining coprocessor hardware and software” describes how to order the hardware from IBM, how to download the software through the Internet, and how to install the downloaded files.

2. **Install the software on the host**: Chapter 3, “Installing the Support Program” describes how to install the downloaded software onto the coprocessor host computer.

3. **Load the coprocessor software**: Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor” describes how to load both the embedded operating system and the CCA application program.

4. **Set up the cryptographic node**: You can establish a CCA cryptographic node using the utilities provided with the Support Program, or by linking your application programs to the CCA API. You should also verify the access control and other setup requirements imposed by application software you plan to use with the IBM 4764. The CCA Node Management (CNM) utility described in Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node” includes setup and management functions needed to:
   - Load the FCV
   - Create and edit the access-control data
   - Manage the coprocessor master key
   - Manage primary KEKs
   - Manage the storage of data keys
   - Create lists (“scripts”) for the CCA Node Initialization (CNI) utility
5. **Link application programs to the CCA libraries:** Chapter 6, “Building applications to use with the CCA API” describes how to build applications for CCA and how to link them to the CCA libraries.

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Chapter 2. Obtaining coprocessor hardware and software

The IBM CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program features are available for download through the Internet on the product order page at http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards. This chapter describes:

- How to choose, order, and install coprocessor hardware
- How to download the software

How to order and install coprocessor hardware

The following sections describe how to:

- Order coprocessors
- Replace batteries
- Place orders for the IBM 4764 hardware
- Install your IBM 4764 hardware

Ordering coprocessors

The IBM 4764-001 is ordered from IBM as a machine type-model. The coprocessor can be installed in the IBM eServer™ xSeries® 226 server. The coprocessor requires a PCI-X slot that accepts a standard short-type PCI-X adapter card. If you encounter difficulty, contact IBM at the http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards product Web site. IBM will endeavor to assist in problem determination and resolution, but makes no commitment that problems with other system types can be resolved.

The software will support up to three coprocessors per system.

Replacement batteries

IBM offers a replacement-battery kit (feature code 1008) so that you can maintain the functionality of the coprocessor. The batteries provide backup power to a small quantity of internal memory, the clock-calendar, the tamper-detection circuitry, and so forth.

**Important:** It is imperative that batteries with sufficient stored-energy power the coprocessor during its entire useful life. When the coprocessor is not in a powered-on system and the batteries fail or are removed from the coprocessor, the unit will zeroize and be rendered permanently inoperable. **There is no recovery from this situation.**

The battery kit contains two batteries and a temporary-battery tray. The shelf life of the batteries in the kit is nearly the same as the useful life of batteries mounted in an IBM 4764 that is continuously powered on. A battery kit should be ordered and the batteries changed as a planned maintenance activity every 3 years. The actual life of the batteries is anticipated to be in excess of 5 years. When you do change batteries, ensure that the replacement batteries are fresh and have not been in inventory for a long period.

To order a battery kit, order feature code 1008.

How to place orders for the IBM 4764 coprocessor

To order the coprocessor hardware, contact your local IBM Representative or your IBM Business Partner, and order the model and features you have chosen.
Customers in the U.S.A. can also contact IBM Direct at 1-800-IBM-CALL. Specifically mention IBM 4764 so that you can discuss your order with the group that processes IBM 4764 orders.

How to install your IBM 4764 hardware

The IBM 4764 is installed in a manner similar to other PCI-X boards. Follow the process described in the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual.

Ensure that you never remove the coprocessor batteries except as outlined in the battery-replacement procedure in the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual. The coprocessor is certified at the factory. If it ever detects tampering, or if both battery power and system power are simultaneously removed, the factory certification is zeroized and the coprocessor is rendered non-functional. There is no recovery from this situation.

It is possible to inadvertently cause a tamper event if you cause some of the coprocessor circuitry to short-circuit. Remember that the batteries on the coprocessor supply power to tamper sensors. If in handling the coprocessor you cause a short circuit in this circuitry, this could result in a tamper event. This is very unlikely to occur, but you should be careful when installing the coprocessor to keep the circuitry on the board from contacting conductive portions of the host machine or adjacent boards.

How to download the software


Tip: To be sure you receive the latest version of the Support Program, wait to download the software until you have received your coprocessor. At that time you should also check the Web site for any available fixes. See the Spotlight section of the product Web site at http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards.

From the Software download page, select the software that you require by operating-system platform, release level, and Support Program as indicated on the Software download page of the product Web site, http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards. You are prompted to complete a registration procedure, then you are presented with a page from which you choose items to download.

If you plan to use the Support Program on multiple host computers, you can copy the downloaded files to the other hosts.

Now you are able to install the Support Program; see Chapter 3, “Installing the Support Program.”
Chapter 3. Installing the Support Program

After downloading the software as described in Chapter 2, “Obtaining coprocessor hardware and software,” follow the procedures in this chapter to install the CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program onto the coprocessor host computer. (Loading software into the coprocessor is described in Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor” and initializing the CCA application within the coprocessor is described in Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node.”

This chapter:
• Lists the Support Program components you are installing
• Lists system prerequisites to installing the software
• Describes how to install the software
• Describes how to uninstall the software
• Discusses special security considerations

Support Program components

The procedures in this chapter describe how to install the following Support Program components onto the host computer:
• Device drivers for the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor.
• The shared libraries or DLLs necessary to link the CCA application program interface (API) to the coprocessor driver.
• The Coprocessor Load Utility and software files necessary to load the operating system and the CCA application program into the coprocessor; the utility is described in Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor.”
• The CCA Node Management (CNM) utility necessary to load the function-control vector (FCV) into the coprocessor and to set up a cryptographic node; the utility is described in Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node.”

This chapter also describes how to uninstall the Support Program.

How to install and uninstall coprocessor host software

For each operating system, the following sections:
• List the requirements for the Support Program.
• Describe how to install the Support Program.
• Describe how to uninstall the Support Program.

After you have installed the platform-specific software as described in this chapter, you are ready to install software into the coprocessor; see Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor.”

Note that all components of the installed CCA package might not indicate the same version number. The version number for a software component is only updated when the component is changed for a release. Unchanged components retain the version number from the last time they were modified. For example, the Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Software might be at a different level from the coprocessor device driver.
How to install and uninstall the Support Program for Linux

This section includes a description of the Support Program system requirements and procedures necessary to install and uninstall the base release 3.24 software for Novell’s SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 9.

Important: The installation process requires root-level authority; it must be performed by a system administrator with that authority.

Linux Requirements
Before you install the Support Program, ensure that your system meets the following requirements:

Hardware:
An IBM eServer xSeries 226 server with an available PCI-X cryptographic coprocessor feature.

During installation of the software, the driver interacts with the coprocessor to arbitrate interrupt settings, DMA channels, and other system resources. For installation instructions regarding the coprocessor hardware and device driver, refer to the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual.

Software:
Novell’s SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 9
Java™ runtime environment 1.4.2 or later; this is required to use the CCA Node Management utility

This software package that you download from the product Web site, http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards:
– Release 3.24.0 CCA Support, file setup4764_3.24.0_date.bin, where date is the file-creation date

How to install the Support Program base release 3.24
To install the Support Program in Linux:
1. Download the software package from the product Web site. Ensure that the permissions on the downloaded executable allow execution by root.
2. Log on as root.

Note: Do not use the su command to switch user to root; su to root is not sufficient.
3. Run the downloaded executable. Complete the prompts as needed.
4. Log out and log on again as an appropriate user to activate changes in /etc/profile.

Be sure to read or print /opt/IBM/4764/readme.txt; this file contains the latest information about the Support Program product.

Configure the software as described in "How to configure the Support Program."

How to configure the Support Program
When initializing CCA key-storage with either the CNM utility or with the CSNBKSI CCA verb, you must use the DES and PKA key-file information entered during installation. These values are defined in CSUxxx environment variables.

The DES_Key_Record_List verb and PKA_Key_Record_List verb produce list files in the /opt/IBM/4764/keys/deslist and /opt/IBM/4764/keys/pkalist directories, respectively. These are the default directory names. Depending on your installation,
these directory names might have been changed from their default names. These list files are created under the ownership of the environment of the user that requests the list service. Make sure the files created keep the same group ID as your installation requires. This can also be achieved by setting the “set-group-id-on-execution” bit on in these two directories. See the g+s flags in the chmod command for full details. Not doing this might cause errors to be returned on key-record-list verbs.

To assign a default CCA coprocessor, use the EXPORT command to set the environment variable CSU_DEFAULT_ADAPTER to CRP0n, where n = 1, 2, or 3, depending on which installed CCA coprocessor you want as the default. If this environment variable is not set when the first CCA verb of a process is called, the CCA software sets coprocessor CRP01 as the default. If this environment variable is set to an invalid value, you will get an error until the environment variable is set to a valid value.

The CCA implementation provides caching of key records obtained from key storage within the CCA host code. However, the host cache is unique for each host process. If different host processes access the same key record, an update to a key record caused in one process will not affect the contents of the key cache held for other process(es). Caching of key records within the key storage system can be suppressed so that all processes will access the most current key records. To suppress caching of key records, use the EXPORT command to set the environment variable CSUCACHE to NO. If this environment variable is not set, or is set to anything other than NO (case is ignored), caching of key records will not be suppressed.

**CCA Support Program and Linux file permissions**

The CCA Support Program relies on file permissions at the group level to function correctly. This means that the users and administrators of the Support Program must have the correct group file permissions on the CCA shared objects, utilities, and key-storage files and directories in order to be fully functional and run without errors.

*Note:* Key-storage files and directories are defined as those files and directories that are contained in the key-storage directory including the top level key-storage directory, that is, in the default configuration, all the files and directories below the /opt/IBM/4764/keys directory, and the /opt/IBM/4764/keys directory itself.

For proper operation, the key-storage files and directories must have a group ID of the application user group.

Also, as a general rule, all key-storage directories should have file permissions of 770 (drwxrws---) and be "owned" by user root and group users. All key-storage files should have file permissions of 660 (-rw-rw----).

**Updating from a prior release**

When updating the CCA software in a Linux system, be aware that the installation process might delete your host-system key-storage files. Make a backup copy of these files prior to starting the installation. Restore these files following the Support Program installation provided that you have not changed master keys in the coprocessor during the installation process.
Note: Use of a CLU file1 of the form CRSxxxxx.clu will zeroize any preexisting master keys, retained keys, roles, and profiles. Therefore you should not restore the key-storage files.

How to view xSeries coprocessor hardware errors
Errors occurring in the coprocessor hardware are recorded in the /var/log/messages file. To view the log, enter the following command:

```
cat /var/log/messages | more
```

How to uninstall the Support Program
To uninstall the Support Program in Linux:
1. Back up or save your key-storage files before you uninstall the Support Program. The uninstall does not delete or change key-storage files, but creating a backup copy is good practice.
2. Log on as root.
3. Enter the command /opt/IBM/4764/_uninst/uninstall_4764.bin; the coprocessor device driver and other related information are removed. The key-storage directories and files remain.

How to install and uninstall the Support Program for Windows
This section includes a description of the Support Program system requirements and procedures necessary to install and uninstall the base release 3.24 software for Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Standard Edition (32-bit). Before you install the 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor, ensure that you have the Support Program installed. If you accidentally power on a Windows system that has a 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor installed but does not have the Support Program installed, you will need to uninstall the “Coprocessor” entry in the hardware device list before the Support Program will work properly. To do this, follow these steps:
1. From the Windows Control Panel, open the Add/Remove Hardware folder and activate the Add/Remove Hardware Wizard to uninstall the “Coprocessor” entry in the hardware device list.
2. If you have multiple coprocessors installed on the system, repeat step [1] until all of the “Coprocessor” entries in the hardware device list are removed.

Important: The installation process modifies the Windows Registry, so it must be performed by a user with the administrator privilege.

Ensure that your system meets the following requirements:

Windows requirements
Before you install the Support Program, ensure that your system meets the following requirements:

Hardware:
An IBM eServer xSeries 226 server with an IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor installed.
During installation of the software, the driver interacts with the coprocessor to arbitrate interrupt settings, DMA channels, and other system resources. For installation instructions regarding the coprocessor hardware and device driver, refer to the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual.

1. The Coprocessor Load Utility is explained in Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor,” on page 4-1.
Software:

Java runtime environment 1.4.2 or later; this is required to use the CCA Node Management utility

How to install the Support Program base release 3.24

To install the Support Program in Windows:

1. Enter the command `setup4764_3.24.0_date.exe`, where `date` is the file creation date. Complete the prompts as needed.

2. Adjust the Windows System Time.

   You must set the Windows "TZ" (time zone) environment variable. The CCA access-control-system logon function requires that the system clock and the coprocessor clock-calendar be in close synchronization. The CCA Support Program presumes that the system clock and the time zone settings have been correctly established.

   You issue a console command to temporarily set the TZ variable. For example, for the Eastern time zone in the U.S.A.:

   ```
   SET TZ=EST5EDT,4,1,0,7200,10,-1,0,7200,3600
   ```

   For proper operation, you must completely set the TZ environment variable.

   ```
   SET TZ=SSSh[:m[:s]]DDD,sm,sw,sc,st,em,ew,et,shift
   ```

   Table 3-1. TZ environment variable settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Default value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>Standard-Time zone identifier. It must be three characters, must begin with a letter, and can contain spaces. Zone names are determined by local or country convention. For example, EST stands for Eastern Standard Time and applies to parts of North America.</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h, m, s</td>
<td>The variable h specifies the difference (in hours) between the Standard Time zone and Coordinated Universal Time (CUT), formerly Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). You can optionally use m to specify minutes after the hour, and s to specify seconds after the minute. A positive number denotes time zones west of the Greenwich meridian; a negative number denotes time zones east of the Greenwich meridian. The number must be an integer value.</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDD</td>
<td>Daylight Savings Time (DST) zone identifier. It must be three characters, must begin with a letter, and can contain spaces.</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sm</td>
<td>Starting month (1 to 12) of DST.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sw</td>
<td>Starting week (-4 to 4) of DST. Use negative numbers to count back from the last week of the month (-1) and positive numbers to count from the first week (1).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd</td>
<td>Starting day of DST.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>st</td>
<td>Starting time (in seconds) of DST.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-1. TZ environment variable settings (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Default value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>em</td>
<td>Ending month (1 to 12) of DST.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ew</td>
<td>Ending week (-4 to 4) of DST. Use negative numbers to count back from the last week of the month (-1) and positive numbers to count from the first week (1).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ed</td>
<td>Ending day of DST. 0 to 6 if ew != 0 1. to 31 if ew = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>et</td>
<td>Ending time of DST (in seconds).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shift</td>
<td>Amount of time change (in seconds).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To make the TZ setting automatic, go to the Control Panel, open the System folder, then select the Advanced tab. Activate the Environment Variables... button followed by the New... button. In the box labeled Variable Name, enter TZ, and in the box labeled Variable Value, enter the TZ parameters as defined for the SET TZ statement. Activate the OK button when done.

Configure the software as described in "How to configure the Support Program."

How to configure the Support Program

To assign a default CCA coprocessor, use the SET™ command to set the environment variable CSU_DEFAULT_ADAPTER to CRP0n, where n = 1, 2, or 3, depending on which installed CCA coprocessor you want as the default. If this environment variable is not set when the first CCA verb of a process is called, the CCA software uses coprocessor CRP01 as the default. If this environment variable is set to an invalid value, you will get an error until the environment variable is set to a valid value.

The CCA implementation provides caching of key records obtained from key storage within the CCA host code. However, the host cache is unique for each host process. If different host processes access the same key record, an update to a key record caused in one process will not affect the contents of the key cache held for any other process(es). Caching of key records within the key-storage system can be suppressed so that all processes will access the most current key records. To suppress caching of key records, use the SET command to set the environment variable CSUCACHE to NO. If this environment variable is not set, or is set to anything other than NO (case is ignored), caching of key records will not be suppressed.

How to uninstall the Support Program

To uninstall the Support Program in Windows:

1. Back up or save your key-storage files before you uninstall the Support Program. The uninstall process does not delete or change key-storage files, but creating a backup copy is good practice.
2. Go to the Windows Control Panel.
3. Open the Add/Remove Programs folder; IBM 4764 Cryptographic Coprocessor for Windows is displayed in the list of software.
5. Activate the Change/Remove... button; you are prompted to confirm file deletion.
6. Activate the Yes button; the software is removed.
Special considerations

The CNM utility provides a way to manage access-control points. To help protect against accidental or intentional corruption of the CNM utility's executable file, you should set the file permission of HIKM.zip to read & execute only. Likewise, to protect the data file of access-control points, set the file permission of csuap.def to read only.
Chapter 4. Loading software into the coprocessor

After installing the Support Program on the host computer, as described in Chapter 3, “Installing the Support Program,” use the Coprocessor Load Utility (CLU) to load the coprocessor operating system and CCA application into the coprocessor.

If you obtain updates to the Support Program, use the CLU utility to reload the necessary program segments. You can also load software from other vendors using the CLU utility.

This chapter includes:

- Instructions for using the CLU utility to understand what coprocessors are installed and their status, and to install and uninstall the software that runs within the coprocessor
- A reference section describing:
  - The coprocessor memory segments
  - Validating the coprocessor status
  - The syntax used to invoke the CLU utility
  - CLU-utility return codes

For a deeper understanding of the code-loading controls and the security considerations implemented by the coprocessor, see the research paper Building a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor that is available on the product Web site Library page at http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards.

Notes:

1. The file locations referenced in this chapter are the default directory paths.
2. Appendix C, “Device driver error codes” describes error codes returned by the coprocessor device driver. These are often presented in the form of a hexadecimal number such as X’8040xxxx’. You might encounter some of these error situations, especially when you first use the CLU utility and are less familiar with the product and its procedures.
3. The coprocessor function-control vector (FCV) is loaded by the CCA Node Management utility described in Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node.”

How to load coprocessor software

This section provides the procedures you use in loading software into the coprocessor. Refer to the readme.txt file that accompanies the software distribution you are installing for specific .clu file names. The readme.txt file might also provide additional information that amplifies or modifies these general procedures.

You will be instructed to follow this sequence of steps:

1. At a command prompt, change to the directory with the CLU files
2. Determine the software currently resident within the coprocessor
3. Change the contents of software Segments 1, 2, and 3, as appropriate
4. Validate the final contents of the software segments

Changing the default directory and running CLU

You will need to locate the directory that contains the coprocessor code files (*.clu) and possibly the CLU utility. At a command prompt, change to the directory for the code files. If the CLU utility is not in this directory, ensure that your operating
system can locate the CLU utility. On a Windows system, the CLU utility must either
be located in the default directory or be included in the path statement. The default
coprocessor code directories are:

**Linux**
```
/opt/IBM/4764/clu
```

**Windows**
```
\Program Files\IBM\4764\clu
```

On a Windows system, you can issue a change directory command that includes a
space character by enclosing the parameter in quotation marks. For example:
```
cd "\Program Files\IBM\4764\clu"
```

To run the CLU utility, you enter the program name at the command prompt,
```
csuxclu
```
where “x” is different for the two operating systems:

**Linux**
```
csulclu
```

**Windows**
```
csunclu
```

You can provide parameters interactively to the CLU utility, or you can include these
on the command line input. (See "[Coprocessor Load Utility syntax](#)" on page 4-7.)

Each time that you use CLU you will need to specify a log file name. This is the first
parameter and can be included on the command line. In general, when working with
a specific coprocessor, it is strongly recommended you use the coprocessor serial
number as the log file name. You can obtain the serial number from the label on the
bracket at the end of the coprocessor. By always naming the log file with the serial
number, you can keep a complete history of status and code changes for the
contents of each coprocessor.

CLU will append information to two log files. If the log files do not exist, they will be
created. One log file contains the same information that is normally displayed on
your console. The other log file, to which CLU will assign MRL as the file name
extension, contains a “machine-readable log.” The MRL file is intended for use with
an analysis utility.

Subsequent instructions in this section assume that you use CLU interactively.
Change to the directory that contains the coprocessor code files. Start CLU with the
name appropriate to your operating system. Respond to the prompts as requested.

CLU obtains the number of installed coprocessors from the device driver. If you
have more than one installed coprocessor, CLU will interactively ask you for the
“number” of the coprocessor with which you intend to interact. These numbers
("coprocessor_#") range from 0 to 2. To correlate these numbers to a particular
coprocessor, use the System Status ("SS") command to learn the number for each
of the installed coprocessors. (See [Figure 4-2](#) on page 4-10.)

**Note:** The CLU utility can only operate with a coprocessor when it can obtain
exclusive control of the coprocessor. If any other application (thread) is
running that has performed CCA verb calls, all of the coprocessors that are
loaded with CCA will be “busy” and unusable by CLU.

**Important:** When using CLU, no applications that use CCA should be running.

**Determining coprocessor software segment contents**

The coprocessor has three “segments”: Segment 1, Segment 2, and Segment 3.
Each segment:
- Has a status
• Holds software
• Holds a validation public key
• Has an owner identifier (except Segment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Miniboot,&quot; contains diagnostics and code loading controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Embedded control program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CCA, or another application</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You determine the current content and status of the coprocessor segments using the ST command. Figure 4-1 shows a typical ST response. Information in bold text is discussed next.

```
CSUCLU V3.08 324test.log ST 6 begun Tue Jun 7 89:28:25 2005
************ Command ST started. ---- Tue Jun 7 89:28:25 2005

*** VPD data; PartNum = 6007528
*** VPD data; EC Num = 6312753
*** VPD data; Ser Num = 93000362
*** VPD data; Description = IBM 4764-650 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor
*** VPD data; Mfg. Loc. = 91
*** ROM Status; PIC ver: 25, ROM ver: 205
*** ROM Status; INIT: INITIALIZED
*** ROM Status; SEGS: RUNNABLE, OWNERS: 2
*** ROM Status; SEG5: RUNNABLE, OWNERS: 2
*** Page 1 Certified: YES
*** Segment 1 Image: 3.24 POSTlv2.16 MBiv1.25 FPCCav78 2605621506613240800022800080000000000000000
*** Segment 1 Revision: 324
*** Segment 1 Hash: CI6F 4192 0969 51FE 4FA8 4486 3B3A 374E 4444 3B8B
*** Segment 2 Image: 3.24 Linux OS vi.2 2605620000E2324080800000000000000000000
*** Segment 2 Revision: 324
*** Segment 2 Hash: AE8B 5B4B 0858 1865 F5A8 88A1 17FE A888 DC4C 69A3
*** Segment 3 Image: 3.24 CCA 2605658123724190800000000000000000000
*** Segment 3 Revision: 324
*** Segment 3 Hash: 2B43 5003 5ECC D99E 1232 6DE8 F938 8F37 146B C3FB
*** Query Adapter Status successful ***
Obtain Status ended successfully!
************ Command ST ended. ---- Tue Jun 7 09:29:45 2005
```

```
CSUCLU V3.08 324test.log EX 6 begun Tue Jun 7 11:01:47 2005
************ Command EX exited. ---- Tue Jun 7 11:01:47 2005
```

Figure 4-1. Typical CLU status response

**Item** | **Discussion**
---|---
Ser Num | The serial number of the coprocessor.

**Description**
A statement that describes the type of coprocessor in general terms. Auditors should review this and other status information to confirm that an appropriate coprocessor is in use.

**ROM Status**
The coprocessor must always be in an INITIALIZED state. If the status is ZEROIZED, the coprocessor has detected a possible tamper event and is in an unrecoverable, non-functional state. (Unintended “tamper” events can be created by improper handling of the coprocessor. Only remove the batteries when following the recommended battery changing procedure, maintain the coprocessor in the safe temperature range, and so forth. See the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual.)
ROM Status SEG2 / SEG3
Several status conditions for Segment 2 and Segment 3 exist, including:
- Unowned: currently not in use, no content
- Runnable: contains code and is in a generally usable state

Owner identifiers are also shown. The standard CCA Support Program is assigned identifier 02 for both Segment 2 and Segment 3. Any other owner identifier indicates that the software is not the standard IBM CCA product code. In all cases, ensure that the proper software is loaded in your coprocessor. Unauthorized or unknown software can represent a security risk to your installation.

Segment 1 Image
The name and description of the software content of Segment 1. For a factory-fresh coprocessor, the name will include “Factory.” This image and associated validation key will need to be changed.

For a previously loaded coprocessor, the Segment 1 name will probably include “CCA.” Ensure that you observe the revision level.

Segment 2 and Segment 3 Images
If these segments have Owned status, observe the image name and the revision level. IBM incorporates “CCA” in the image name to indicate that the image is provided as part of the CCA Support Program. Be sure to observe the revision level.

Changing software segment contents
Generally the software within the coprocessor must be at the same release level as the CCA software in the hosting system. Do not attempt to mix-and-match different release levels except with specific instructions from IBM.

Start the CLU utility and enter the parameters interactively (see “Changing the default directory and running CLU” on page 4-1).
- Enter the log file name (#######.LOG, where ####### is the serial number of the coprocessor).
- Enter the command, PL.
- If there are multiple coprocessors, enter the coprocessor number.
- Enter the CLU file name as indicated in the readme.txt file.

Repeat as required so that the proper software is loaded for Segments 1, 2, and 3.

Validating the coprocessor segment contents
After you have loaded or replaced the code inSegments 1, 2, and 3, use the CLU VA command to confirm the segment contents and validate the digital signature on the response created by the coprocessor. Depending on the IBM 4764 coprocessor in use,1 issue this command and substitute the file name from the table below for the class-key file name. Note that the file name is the coprocessor part number followed by “.v.clu”.

\[\text{csuxclu} \text{#####.log} \text{VA [coprocessor_#]} \text{xxxxxxx.clu}\]

Table 4-1. Class-key file for use with the CLU VA command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coprocessor</th>
<th>File name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 001, 3.3 volt</td>
<td>12r8565v.clu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. You can refer to the IBM product Web site (http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards) FAQ section for the procedure to validate coprocessor integrity. That topic carries the current list of class-key certificate files.
The readme.txt file describes the Image Names that you should observe. “[coprocessor_#]” is the optionally required designator for a particular coprocessor and defaults to zero.

How to unload coprocessor software and zeroize the CCA node

When you use CLU to process a file that surrenders ownership of Segment 2, both Segment 2 and the subordinate Segment 3 are cleared: the code is removed, the validating public key for the segment is cleared, the security-relevant data items held within the coprocessor for the segment are zeroized, the owner identifiers are cleared, and the segment’s status is set to “UNOWNED.”

Refer to the readme.txt file that accompanies the software distribution you are using for the specific .clu file name used to surrender ownership of Segments 2 and 3. The readme.txt file might also provide additional information that amplifies or modifies this general procedure.

Perform these actions:
• Change to the directory that contains the CLU files
• Start the CLU utility, csuxclu, where x = l for Linux and x = n for Windows
• Respond to the prompts and use the serial number of the coprocessor in the logfile name
• Use the PL command to surrender Segment 2 as indicated in the readme.txt file for your platform

Notes:
1. You can also zeroize CCA without removing the software by using the CCA reinitialize process. See “How to initialize (zeroize) the node” on page 5-7.
2. IBM does not normally make available a file to restore the factory Segment 1 validating key to put the coprocessor into a condition similar to a factory-fresh product. Segment 1 can only be changed a limited number of times before the available Device Key certificate space is exhausted and the coprocessor is potentially rendered unusable. If you require a capability to restore the Segment 1 factory validating key, and are willing to expose your coprocessor to a possible lock-up condition, you can obtain the required file from IBM by submitting a query using the Support Form on the product Web site, http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards.

Coprocessor Load Utility reference

If you are interested in additional details concerning the coprocessor code loading process, continue reading this section. Otherwise, continue reading at Chapter 5, “Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node.”

This reference section describes:
• The coprocessor memory segments into which you load the software
• The way in which the coprocessor validates software loads
• The syntax used to invoke the CLU utility
• CLU utility return codes
Coprocessor memory segments

Coprocessor memory segments are organized as shown in the following table:

Table 4-2. Organization of memory segments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Basic code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The basic code manages coprocessor initialization and the hardware component interfaces. This code cannot be changed after the coprocessor leaves the factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Software administration and cryptographic routines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Software in this segment:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Administers the replacement of software already loaded to Segment 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Administers the loading of data and software to segments 2 and 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is loaded at the factory, but can be replaced using the CLU utility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Embedded operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The coprocessor Support Program includes the operating system; the operating system supports applications loaded into Segment 3. Segment 2 is empty when the coprocessor is shipped from the factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Application software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The coprocessor Support Program includes a CCA application program that can be installed into Segment 3. The application functions according to the IBM CCA and performs access control, key management, and cryptographic operations. Segment 3 is empty when the coprocessor is shipped from the factory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Validation of coprocessor software loads

When the coprocessor is shipped from the factory, it has within it the public key needed to validate replacement software for Segment 1.

Loading code into coprocessor Segment 2 and Segment 3 is a two-step process for each segment.

1. First, an “owner identifier” for a segment is sent to the coprocessor using an Establish Owner command. The owner identifier is only accepted if the digital signature associated with this identifier can be validated by the public key residing with the immediately lower segment. Once established, ownership remains in effect until a Surrender Owner command is processed by the coprocessor.

2. Second, a “code load” for a segment is sent to the coprocessor. Two different commands are available.

   a. Initially use the Load command. Load-command data includes a public-key certificate that must be validated by the public key already residing with the next-lower segment. If the certificate is validated, and if the owner identifier in the Load-command data matches the current ownership held by the coprocessor for the segment, and if the complete Load-command data can be validated by the public key in the just-validated certificate, the coprocessor will accept the code and retain the validated public-key for the segment.
b. If a segment already has a public key, a **Reload** command can be used to replace the code in a segment. The coprocessor actions are the same as for a **Load** command, except that the included certificate must be validated by the public key associated with the target segment rather than the key associated with the next-lower segment\(^2\).

The embedded operating system, working with the coprocessor hardware, can store security-relevant data items (SRDIs) on behalf of itself and an application in Segment 3. The SRDIs are zeroized upon tamper detection, loading of segment software, or a **Surrender Owner** of a segment. Note that the SRDIs for a segment are not zeroized when using the **Reload** command. The CCA application stores the master keys, the FCV, the access-control tables, and retained RSA private keys as SRDI information associated with Segment 3.

IBM signs its own software. Should another vendor intend to supply software for the coprocessor, that vendor’s **Establish Owner** command and code-signing public-key certificate must have been signed by IBM under a suitable contract. These restrictions ensure that:
- Only authorized code can be loaded into the coprocessor
- Government restrictions are met relating to the import and export of cryptographic implementations

**Coprocessor Load Utility syntax**

This section details the syntax used to invoke the Coprocessor Load Utility (CLU), and describes each function available in it. Use CLU to:
- Ensure that the coprocessor(s) is not “busy” by ending any application(s) that might have used a coprocessor. For example, end all applications that use the CCA API.
- Obtain the release level and the status of software currently installed in the coprocessor memory segments.
- Confirm the validity of digitally signed messages returned by the coprocessor.
- Load and reload portions of the coprocessor software.
- Reset the coprocessor.

To invoke the utility:
1. Log on as required by your operating system.
2. Go to the command line.
3. Change directory to the directory containing the CLU utility files. The default directories are:

   **Linux**
   
   `/opt/IBM/4764/clu`

   **Windows**
   
   `\Program Files\IBM\4764\clu`

4. Enter the utility name followed by the parameters described below. The utility names are:

   **Linux**
   
   `csulclu`

   **Windows**
   
   `csunclu`

If you do not supply the necessary parameters, the utility will prompt you as information is required. Optional parameters are enclosed in brackets. The syntax for the parameters following the utility name is:

---

2. In this publication, the terms “load” and “reload” are employed. Other documentation might refer to these operations as “emergency burn” (EmBurn), and “regular burn” or “remote burn” (RemBurn), respectively.
[log_file cmd  [coprocessor_#] [data_file] [-Q ]]  

where:

log_file
Identifies the logfile name. The utility appends entries to this ASCII text file as it performs the operations requested. A second “machine readable” log file, with a file name of logfile_name.MRL, is also created. This log file can be processed by a program and contains the binary-encoded responses from the coprocessor. For information about the contents of this log file, see Appendix B, “Machine-readable-log contents.”

cmd
Specifies a two-letter abbreviation representing the loader command to be run. See “Coprocessor Load Utility commands” on page 4-9.

coprocessor_#
Provides the coprocessor number as established by the device driver. This parameter defaults to 0. Coprocessors are designated to the device driver as numbers 0, 1, 2. You can use the serial number information that you obtain with the ST or VA commands and the serial number printed on the end-bracket of the coprocessor to correlate a particular coprocessor to the coprocessor_.

data_file
Identifies the data file (drive, directory, and file name) used for the operation requested.

- For software loads and reloads, it is the file name of the software image you are loading into the coprocessor. The CCA Support Program readme.txt file provides the data_file name.
- When obtaining coprocessor status with the VA command, it is the class-key certificate file name used to validate the coprocessor response. The product Web site (http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) area contains a description of the procedure for validating the coprocessor and its code. This description also contains a list of all the current class-key certificate file names. You can download any required certificate file from the Web site.

-Q
Suppresses (quiets) the CLU program output to the standard output device. The status information is still appended to the log files.

Example: To obtain the coprocessor status and save the results to the log file, enter:

csunclu ########.log va datafile_name.clu

It is suggested that you make ######## the serial number of the coprocessor. It is not mandatory to use the serial number, but it can be of value to retain a history of all software changes made to each specific coprocessor.
Coprocessor Load Utility commands
The Coprocessor Load Utility (CLU) supports these loader commands:

**Table 4-3. CLU loader commands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loader command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PL</strong>: Load microcode into coprocessor</td>
<td>Processes a series of the commands as directed by the contents of the data file to establish segment ownership and to load or reload segment software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commands R1, E2, L2, R2, S2, E3, L3, R3, and S3 are inferred from information contained in the data files that you use with the PL command. A single “PL” file can incorporate information for multiple ownership and loading commands.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RS</strong>: Reset the coprocessor</td>
<td>Resets the coprocessor. Generally you will not use this command. The command causes the coprocessor to perform a power-on reset. You might find this command helpful should the coprocessor and the host-system software lose synchronization. You should end all host-system software processes that are operating with the coprocessor prior to issuing this command to enable the complete cryptographic subsystem to get to a reset state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SS</strong>: Obtain system/box status</td>
<td>Obtains the part number, serial number, and a portion of the Segment 3 software image name for each of the installed coprocessors, provided that these are not being used by some application such as CCA. See Figure 4-2 on page 4-10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ST</strong>: Obtain coprocessor status</td>
<td>Obtains the status of loaded software and the release level of other components. The status is appended to the log files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VA</strong>: Validate coprocessor status</td>
<td>Obtains the status of loaded software and the release level of other components. The data is transmitted in a message signed by the coprocessor device key, and then stored in the utility log file. The utility uses its built-in public key to validate the one-or-more class-key certificates contained in <code>datafile_name</code>. One of these certificates should validate the public key, or chain of public keys, obtained from the coprocessor, and confirm that the coprocessor has not been tampered with.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the utility can be invoked by a script file or a command file. When creating a script file or a command file to invoke the utility on an unattended system, add “quiet” syntax `-q` (or `-Q`, `/q`, or `/Q`) to request that nothing be output to the display. By default, the utility returns prompts and messages to the display.
When CLU finishes processing, it returns a value that can be tested in a script file or in a command file. The returned values and their meanings are:

- **0**: OK.
- **1**: Command line parameters not valid.
- **2**: Cannot access the coprocessor. Ensure that the coprocessor and its driver have been properly installed.
- **3**: Check the utility log file for an abnormal condition report.
- **4**: No coprocessor installed. Ensure that the coprocessor and its driver have been properly installed.
- **5**: Invalid coprocessor number specified.
- **6**: A data file is required with this command.
- **7**: The data file specified with this command is incorrect or invalid.
Chapter 5. Using the CNM and CNI utilities to manage the cryptographic node

A computer that provides cryptographic services, such as key generation and digital signature support, is defined here as a cryptographic node. The CCA Node Management (CNM) utility and the CCA Node Initialization (CNI) utility provided with the Support Program are tools to set up and manage the CCA cryptographic services provided by a node.

This chapter includes:

- What the utilities are and how to start them
- Three sample scenarios on how to use the utilities that you should consider

In addition, it includes several sections with details on specific utility topics:

- How to use the CNM utility administrative functions: Things that you should be aware of in the CNM utility. You should review this material after working through the topic “How to establish a test node” on page 5-3.
- How to create and manage access-control data: Some details about the access-control portion of the CNM utility.
- How to manage cryptographic keys: Some of the key management things you can accomplish with the CNM utility.
- Using the CNI utility to establish other nodes: How you can automate use of the CNM utility using encapsulated procedures.

Note: This chapter describes the major functions of the CNM utility. For additional information about specific panels and fields, refer to the online help panels included with the utility.

These utilities are written in Java® and require use of a Java runtime environment (JRE). You can also use the Java Development Kit (JDK). For a description of the system setup required to run these utilities, see:

- “Linux Requirements” on page 3-2
- “Windows requirements” on page 3-4

Overview

Typical users of the CNM utility and the CNI utility are security administration personnel, application developers, system administrators, and, in some cases, production-mode operators.

Notes:

1. The CNM utility furnishes a limited set of the CCA API services. After becoming familiar with the utility, you can determine whether it meets your needs or whether you require a custom application to achieve more comprehensive administrative control and key management.

2. Files that you create through use of the CNM utility might be dependent on the release of the Java runtime environment. If you change the release of the Java runtime environment that you use, files that you have created with the CNM utility might not function correctly with the new release.

3. The CNM utility has been designed for use with a mouse. Use the mouse click instead of the Enter key for consistent results.
4. No help panels are provided for the Master-Key Cloning portion of the utility. See “How to clone a master key” on page 5-17.

5. These utilities use the IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) API to request services from the coprocessor. The IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors contains a comprehensive list of the verbs (also known as “callable services” or “procedure calls”) provided by the CCA API. Refer to this book and the individual services described herein to understand which commands might require authorization in the various roles that you will define using the procedures described in this chapter.

CCA Node Management utility overview

The CCA Node Management utility is a Java application that provides a graphical user interface to use in the setup and configuration of IBM 4764 CCA cryptographic nodes. The utility functions primarily to set up a node, create and manage access-control data, and manage the CCA master-keys necessary to administer a cryptographic node.

You can load data objects directly into the coprocessor or save them to disk. The data objects are usable at other IBM 4764 CCA nodes that use the same operating system and a compatible level of Java.

How to start the CCA Node Management Utility

To start the CCA Node Management utility:

- On SLES 9 systems:
  1. Change directory to /opt/IBM/4764/cnm
  2. Enter csulcnm on the command line

- On Windows Server 2003 systems:
  1. Change directory to \Program Files\IBM\4764\cnm
  2. Enter csuncnm on the command line

The CNM utility logo and then the main panel are displayed.

CCA Node Initialization utility overview

The CCA Node Initialization utility runs scripts that you create using the CNI Editor within the CNM utility. These scripts are known as CNI lists. The CNI utility can run the CNM utility functions necessary to set up a node; for example, it can be used to load access-control roles and profiles.

As you create a CNI list, you specify the disk location of the data objects that the CNI utility will load into the target nodes. After creating a CNI list, you can distribute the CNI list and any accompanying data files (for roles, profiles, and so forth) to nodes where the CNI utility will be used for an “automated” setup. The source node and all nodes running the distributed CNI list must employ the same operating system and a compatible level of Java.

The CNI utility is further explained in “Using the CNI utility to establish other nodes” on page 5-22.

How to use the utilities, sample scenarios

The following scenarios illustrate how to use the utilities:
1. Establish a test node to be used to develop applications or establish procedures for using the CNM utility. First-time users should follow this procedure to begin experimentation with the utility and the coprocessor.

2. Establish nodes for a production environment using key parts. This scenario employs CNI lists to automate establishment of “target” production nodes.

3. Clone a master key from one coprocessor to another coprocessor. This is a procedure of interest to very high-security installations that employ multiple coprocessors.

The purpose of the scenarios is to illustrate how the procedures described in this chapter can be used. Where appropriate, a scenario cross-refers to sections with more detailed information.

If you are not familiar with the coprocessor’s CCA access-control system, see “Access-control overview” on page 5-8 and “Initial state of the access-control system” on page 5-9. Here you will find an explanation of terms like role, initial-DEFAULT role, and user profile. The scenarios assume that the access-control system is in its initial state.

Note: These scenarios are instructional only. You are encouraged to determine the procedures best suited for your specific environment. Review the contents of Appendix H in the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors. This appendix describes observations on secure operations.

How to establish a test node

In this scenario, a single developer sets up a node to allow unlimited access to cryptographic services.

Important: The resulting cryptographic node should not be considered secure because under this scenario many sensitive commands are permitted unrestricted use.

1. Install the coprocessor and the IBM CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program as described in the previous chapters. Start the CNM utility as described in “How to start the CCA Node Management Utility” on page 5-2. Remember that you must have installed an appropriate level of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) or the Java Development Kit (JDK).

2. If you have more than one coprocessor with CCA installed, specify to the CNM utility which coprocessor you want to use. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Select Adapter. You will see a drop-down list of available adapter numbers (ranging from one up to a maximum of eight). Choose an adapter (coprocessor) from the list. If you do not use the Select Adapter pull-down to choose an adapter, the default adapter (coprocessor) is used.

3. Synchronize the clock within the coprocessor and host computer. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Time; a submenu is displayed. From the submenu, select Set; the clocks are synchronized.

4. Use the CNM utility to permit all commands in the DEFAULT role. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Roles. Highlight the DEFAULT entry and select Edit. You will see a screen that shows which commands are already enabled and which commands are not enabled by the DEFAULT role. Select Permit All. Then load the modified role back into the coprocessor by selecting Load and then OK.
Before selecting **Cancel**, you could have saved a copy of this “all-commands-enabled” role to your file system using the **Save** button and assigning a file name. You must also select the folder (directory) where you will save the role.

For more detail, see “How to define a role” on page 5-9.

Finish this task by selecting **Cancel**.

5. Load the function-control vector (FCV) into the coprocessor. From the **Crypto Node** pull-down menu, select **Authorization**; a submenu is displayed. From the submenu, select **Load** to specify and load the FCV.

The FCV file that you need to specify is the one that was placed on your server during the installation process. FCVs usually have file names such as “fcv_td2k.crt” and can be found by using the file search utility available with your operating system.

6. Install a master key. From the **Master Key** pull-down menu, select **Auto Set...**; you are prompted to verify the command. Select **Yes**; the coprocessor generates and sets a random master key.

The master key installed with Auto Set has actually passed through the main memory of your system processor as key parts. For production purposes, you should use a more secure method of establishing a master key such as random generation or installation of known key-parts entered by two or more individuals. These options are also accessed from the Master Key pull-down menu.

For more detail, see “How to load the master key automatically” on page 5-15.

7. **Key storage** is a CCA term that describes a place where the Support Program can store DES and RSA cryptographic keys under names that you (or your applications) define. If you will use key storage, one or both of the DES and the RSA (“PKA”) key-storage files must be initialized. See “How to create or initialize key storage” on page 5-20.

### How to establish nodes in a production environment

In this scenario, the responsibility for establishing cryptographic nodes is divided among three individuals, namely, an access-control administrator and two key-management officers. The administrator sets up the node and its access-control system, then the key-management officers load a master key and any required key-encrypting key(s). The key-encrypting keys can be used as transport keys to convey other keys between nodes.

Note that this scenario is focused on installing master keys and high-level, inter-node DES key-encrypting keys from **key parts**. The CCA implementation supports alternatives to the key-part technique such as random master-key generation and distribution of DES keys using techniques based on RSA public-key technology. The key-part technique assumes that there are two **key-management officers** who can be trusted to perform their tasks and to not share their key-part information. This implements a **split knowledge** policy. The access-control system is set up to enforce **dual control** by separating the tasks of the first and second officers.

In this scenario, the access-control administrator uses the CNM utility to prepare CNI lists for the target node(s). The CNI lists automate the process of using the CNM utility at the target node. The administrator prepares a CNI list for the tasks performed by the target node access-control administrator and the two key-management officers.
The administrator must know what commands require authorization in the target node under different conditions, including:

- Normal, limited operation (when the default role is used)
- When performing the access-control-administrator tasks
- When performing each of the key-management-officer tasks
- And under any other special circumstances using additional roles and profiles.

The administrator authorizes commands in the various roles to ensure that only those commands actually required are enabled. Sensitive commands, such as loading a first key-part or loading subsequent key-part(s), are only enabled in roles for users with the responsibility and authority to utilize those commands. It is important to separate the responsibilities so that policies such as “split knowledge” and “dual control” are enforceable by the coprocessor’s access-control system.

For more detail, see “How to create and manage access-control data” on page 5-8.

Access-control administrator procedure

In this task, the access-control administrator uses the CNM utility to prepare CNI lists for the target node(s). To set up the node and create its access-control data, the access-control administrator can:

1. On an established node, start the CNM utility
2. Create and save to disk the access-control data for the target node, including:
   - Supervisory roles and user profiles for the access-control administrator and the key-management officers
   - A DEFAULT role to replace the initial-DEFAULT role
   For more detail, see “How to create and manage access-control data” on page 5-8. For information about creating a CNI list, see “Using the CNI utility to establish other nodes” on page 5-22.
   a. Create a CNI list to:
      1) Synchronize the clock-calendar within the coprocessor and host computer
      2) Load the access-control data
      3) Log on as an access-control administrator
      4) Load the replacement DEFAULT role
      5) Load the FCV
      6) Log off
   b. Create a CNI list for the first key-management officer:
      1) Log on as the first key-management officer
      2) Load a first master-key key-part
      3) As required, load first-part key-encrypting-key information
      4) Log off
   c. Create a CNI list for the second key-management officer:
      1) Log on as the second key-management officer
      2) Load a second master-key key-part
      3) As required, load second-part key-encrypting-key information
      4) Log off
3. Install the coprocessor and the Support Program onto the target node(s).
4. Transport to the target nodes the access-control data and the FCV specified in the CNI list.
5. With the involvement of the key-management officers, on each target node run the CNI lists developed in steps 2a, 2b, and 2c. See “Using the CNI utility to establish other nodes” on page 5-22.

The target nodes are now ready to provide cryptographic service.
Key-management officer procedures
The key-management officers have two tasks:
• Prepare the key parts for eventual use at the target node(s)
• Load the key parts at the target nodes

You have to decide how the key parts will be transported from the point of generation to the point of installation. There are several reasonable scenarios:
1. Generate the key parts at a central place and transport these on diskettes
2. Generate the key parts at a central place and transport these on paper forms
3. Generate the key parts at the point and time of (first) installation. If the key parts will be needed at another time, either to reload or to share with another node, then how the key parts will be transported has to be decided.

You should review the specific capabilities of the CNM utility by working with the utility. Then review the specific approach that you select and test the CCA Node Initialization that has been prepared in conjunction with the access-control administrator.

For more detail, see “How to manage cryptographic keys” on page 5-14.

How to use the CNM utility administrative functions
This section describes how to use the CNM utility administrative functions to:
• Optionally choose among multiple coprocessors
• Initialize (or “zeroize”) the coprocessor
• Log on to and off of the coprocessor node
• Load the coprocessor FCV
• Configure the CNM utility defaults
• Synchronize the clock-calendars within the coprocessor and the host computer
• Poll status information about the coprocessor and the CCA application

How to choose a specific coprocessor
If your system has multiple coprocessors loaded with the CCA code, generally you will need to select the specific coprocessor upon which you wish to operate. If you do not make a selection, you will operate with the default coprocessor. Once you make a coprocessor selection, that selection remains in effect for the current utility session or until you make a different selection within the utility session.

To select an adapter (coprocessor) you want to use, from the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Select Adapter. You will see a drop-down list of available adapter numbers (ranging from one up to a maximum of eight). Choose an adapter (coprocessor) from the list. If you do not use the Select Adapter pull-down to choose an adapter, the default adapter (coprocessor) is used.

Notes:
1. When using the CLU utility, coprocessors are referenced as 0, 1, 2. Any particular coprocessor might or might not have the CCA application installed. With the CNM utility (and other applications that use the CCA API), the coprocessors loaded with the CCA application are designated 1, 2, 3. These new identifiers are assigned by CCA as it scans all of the installed coprocessors for those loaded with the CCA application.
2. When coding a CCA application, keywords CRP01, CRP02, and CRP03 are used to “allocate” a coprocessor. These correspond to the numbers 1, 2, 3 used in the CNM utility pull-down.
How to initialize (zeroize) the node

You can restore the CCA node to its initial state, provided that the role you are operating under (the default role or a logged-on role) permits use of the Reinitialize Device command (offset X'0111'). Use of this command causes clearing of all:
- Master-key registers
- Retained PKA and registered PKA public keys
- Roles and profiles and restoring the access control to its initial state (see "Initial state of the access-control system" on page 5-9).

To initialize the CCA node, select Initialize... from the Crypto Node pull-down menu. You will be asked to confirm your intent to perform this major action.

How to log on and off the node

To log on, select Passphrase Logon... from the File pull-down menu. To log off, select Logoff from the File pull-down menu.

Note: With the exception of the DEFAULT role, access to the coprocessor is restricted by passphrase authentication.

How to load the Function-Control Vector

A function-control vector (FCV) is a signed value provided by IBM to enable the CCA application in the coprocessor to provide a level of cryptographic service consistent with applicable import and export regulations. Under the current regulations all users are entitled to the same level of cryptographic functionality. Therefore, IBM now supplies a single FCV with the CCA Support Program.

You use the CNM utility to load the FCV into the coprocessor. The FCV file is named "fcv_td2k.crt". You can locate this file using the filename search tool provided with your operating system.

To load the FCV:
1. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Authorization; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select Load to specify the FCV file on disk. Specify the file name and select Update. The utility loads the FCV.
3. Select OK to finish the task.

How to configure the CCA Node Management utility

The configuration panel of the CNM utility allows you to indicate directory paths for the files you create with the utility. However, the utility generally does not use the paths that you store in the configuration panel. Instead, the default paths are stored in the Windows environment variables. You might find the configuration panel a useful place to record where you intend to keep the various classes of data items.

How to synchronize the clock-calendars

The coprocessor uses its clock-calendar to record time and date and to prevent replay attacks in passphrase-based profile authentication. After installing the coprocessor, synchronize its clock-calendar with that of the host system.

To synchronize the clock-calendars:
1. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Time; a submenu is displayed.
2. Select Set... from the submenu.
3. Answer **Yes** to synchronize the clock-calendars with the host.
4. Select **OK** to finish this task.

**How to obtain status information**

You can use the CNM utility to obtain the status of the coprocessor and the CCA application. The following status panels are available:

- **CCA Application**: Displays the version and the build date of the application. Also displays the status of the master-key registers. For information about these registers, see "How to manage the master keys" on page 5-14.
- **Adapter**: Displays the coprocessor serial number, ID, and hardware level.
- **Command History**: Displays the five most recent commands and subcommands sent to the coprocessor.
- **Diagnostics**: Indicates whether any of the coprocessor tamper-sensors have been triggered, whether any errors have been logged, and reflects the status of the coprocessor batteries.
- **Export Control**: Displays the maximum strength of the cryptographic keys used by the node, as defined by the FCV resident within the coprocessor.

To view the status panels:

1. From the **Crypto Node** pull-down menu, select **Status**. The CCA application status is displayed.
2. To select other status information, use the buttons at the bottom. The new panel is displayed.
3. Select **Cancel** to finish this task.

**How to create and manage access-control data**

The access-control system of the IBM CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program defines the circumstances under which the coprocessor can be used. It does this by restricting the use of CCA commands. For a list of these commands, refer to Appendix G of the *IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors*. Also, see the "Required commands" section at the end of each verb description.

An administrator can give users differing authority, so that some users can use CCA services not available to others. This section includes an overview of the access-control system and instructions for managing your access-control data. You need to know which commands are required and under what circumstances. You also need to consider that some commands should be authorized only for selected, trusted individuals, or for certain programs that operate at specific times. Generally, you should only authorize those commands that are required so as not to inadvertently enable a capability that could be used to weaken the security of your installation(s). You will obtain the information about command use from the documentation for the applications that you intend to support. Refer to Appendix H in the *IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors* for additional guidance on this topic.

**Access-control overview**

The access-control system restricts or permits the use of commands based on roles and user profiles. Use the CNM utility to create roles that correspond to the needs and privileges of assigned users.
To access the privileges assigned to a role (those that are not authorized in the default role), a user must log on to the coprocessor using a unique user profile. Each user profile is associated with a role. (Multiple profiles can use the same role.) The coprocessor authenticates logons using the passphrase associated with the profile that identifies the user.

**Note:** The term *user* applies to both humans and programs.

The coprocessor always has at least one role—the *default* role. Use of the default role does not require a user profile. Any user can use the services permitted by the default role without logging onto or being authenticated by the coprocessor.

For example, a basic system might include the following roles:

- **Access-Control Administrator:** Can create new user profiles and modify the access rights of current users.
- **Key-Management Officer:** Can change the cryptographic keys. (This responsibility is best shared by two or more individuals making use of rights to enter “first” or “subsequent” key parts.)
- **General User:** Can use cryptographic services to protect his or her work, but has no administrative privileges. If your security plan does not require logon authentication for general users, address their requirements in the DEFAULT role.

**Note:** Few individuals would be assigned the roles of key-management officer or access-control administrator. Generally, the larger population would not log on and thus would have rights granted in the DEFAULT role.

### Initial state of the access-control system

After you have loaded the CCA software support into Segment 3 of the coprocessor, or after the access-control system is initialized, no access-control data exists except for an initial-DEFAULT role that allows unauthenticated users to create and load access-control data. For a full description of this role, see Appendix A, "Initial DEFAULT-role commands," on page A-1.

After creating the roles and profiles needed for your environment—including the supervisory roles necessary to load access-control data and to manage cryptographic keys—remove all permissions assigned to the DEFAULT role. Then, add only those permissions you want to grant to unauthenticated users.

**Important:** The cryptographic node and the data it protects are not secure while the DEFAULT role is permitted to load access-control data.

### How to define a role

A role defines permissions and other characteristics of the users assigned to that role. To define a role:

1. From the **Access Control** pull-down menu, select **Roles**; a list of currently defined roles is displayed.
2. Select **New** to display the Role Management panel; see Figure 5-1 on page 5-10. At any time in the process, select **List** to return to the list of currently defined roles.
3. Define the role:

   **Role ID**
   A character string that defines the name of the role. This name is contained in each user profile associated with this role.

   **Comment**
   An optional character string to describe the role.

   **Required authentication strength**
   When a user logs on, the strength of the authentication provided is compared to the strength level required for the role. If the authentication strength is less than that required, the user cannot log on. Currently only the passphrase authentication method is supported; use a strength of 50.

   **Valid times and valid days**
   These values determine when the user can log on. Note that these times are Coordinated Universal Time. If you are not already familiar with the access-control system, refer to Chapter 2 of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.

   **Restricted operations and permitted operations**
   A list defining the commands the role is allowed to use.

   Each CCA API verb might require one or more commands to obtain service from the coprocessor. The user requesting service must be assigned to a role that permits those commands needed to run the verb.

   For more information about CCA verb calls and commands, refer to the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.

4. Select **Save...** to save the role to disk.
5. Select **Load** to load the role into the coprocessor.
How to modify existing roles

Use the CNM utility to:
- Edit a disk-stored role
- Edit a coprocessor-stored role
- Delete a coprocessor-stored role

Tip: Any existing role can be used as a template to create a new role. When you open a saved role, the existing information is displayed in the Role Definition panel. You need only modify or enter information specific to the new role, then give it a new Role ID and load or save it.

How to edit a disk-stored role

To edit a role stored on disk:
1. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Roles; a list of currently defined roles is displayed.
2. Select Open...; you are prompted to choose a file.
3. Open a file; data is displayed in the Role Definition panel.
4. Edit the role.
5. Select Save... to save the role to disk; select Load to load the role into the coprocessor.

How to edit a coprocessor-stored role

To edit a role stored in the coprocessor:
1. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Roles; a list of currently defined roles is displayed.
2. Highlight the role you want to edit.
3. Select Edit; data is displayed in the Role Definition panel.
4. Edit the role.
5. Select Save... to save the role to disk; select Load to load the role into the coprocessor.

How to delete a coprocessor-stored role

Important: When you delete a role, the CNM utility does not automatically delete or re-assign the user profiles associated with that role. You should delete or re-assign the user profiles associated with a role before you delete the role.

To delete a role stored in the coprocessor:
1. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Roles; a list of currently defined roles is displayed.
2. Highlight the role you want to delete.
3. Select Delete...; the role is deleted.

How to define a user profile

A user profile identifies a specific user to the coprocessor. To define a user profile:
1. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Profiles; a list of currently defined profiles is displayed.
2. Select New to display the Profile Management panel; see Figure 5-2 on page 5-12.
3. Define the user profile:

   **User ID**
   The name given to a user profile of the cryptographic coprocessor.

   **Comment**
   An optional character string to describe the user profile.

   **Activation Date and Expiration Date**
   These values determine the first and last dates when the user can log on to the user profile.

   **Role**
   The name of the role that defines the permissions granted to the user profile.

   **Passphrase and Confirm Passphrase**
   The character string that the user must enter to gain access to the cryptographic node.

   **Passphrase Expiration Date**
   The expiration date for the passphrase. The utility will set this by default to 90 days from the current date. You can change the expiration date. Every passphrase contains an expiration date, which defines the lifetime of that passphrase. This is different from the expiration date of the profile itself.

4. Select **Save...** to save the profile to disk; select **Load** to load the profile into the coprocessor.

5. Select **List** to return to the list of currently defined profiles.

**How to modify existing user profiles**

Use the CNM utility to:
- Edit a disk-stored user profile
- Edit a coprocessor-stored user profile
- Delete a coprocessor-stored user profile
- Reset the user-profile-failure count

**How to edit a disk-stored user profile**

To edit a profile stored on disk:
1. From the **Access Control** pull-down menu, select **Profiles**; a list of currently defined profiles is displayed.

2. Select **Open...**; you are prompted to choose a file.

3. Open a file; data is displayed in the User Profile Definition panel.

4. Edit the profile.

5. Select **Save...** to save the profile to disk; select **Load** to load the profile into the coprocessor.

**How to edit a coprocessor-stored user profile**

To edit a profile stored in the coprocessor:

1. From the **Access Control** pull-down menu, select **Profiles**; a list of currently defined profiles is displayed.

2. Highlight the profile you want to edit.

3. Select **Edit**; data is displayed in the User Profile Definition panel.

4. Edit the profile.

5. Select **Save...** to save the profile to disk; select **Replace** to load the profile into the coprocessor.

**How to delete a coprocessor-stored user profile**

To delete a profile stored in the coprocessor:

1. From the **Access Control** pull-down menu, select **Profiles**; a list of currently defined profiles is displayed.

2. Highlight the profile you want to delete.

3. Select **Delete...**; the profile is deleted.

**How to reset the user-profile failure count**

To prevent unauthorized logons, the access-control system maintains a logon-attempt failure count for each user profile. If the number of failed attempts for a profile exceeds the limit defined in the profile, the offending profile is disabled. To reset the failure count:

1. From the **Access Control** pull-down menu, select **Profiles**; a list of currently defined profiles is displayed.

2. Highlight the profile.

3. Select **Reset FC**; a confirmation dialog box is displayed.

4. Select **Yes** to confirm; the logon-attempt failure count is set to zero.

**How to initialize the access-control system**

When you initialize the access-control system, the CNM utility:

- Clears the access-control data in the coprocessor
- Furnishes the DEFAULT role with the commands required to load access-control data

**Important:** The cryptographic node and the data it protects are not secure while the DEFAULT role is permitted to load access-control data.

Successfully performing this action removes installation-installed access controls and keys and is therefore a very sensitive operation that could render your node inoperable for production. Some installations will choose to remove authorization for this function from their coprocessor’s roles. In this event, if you wish to initialize the CCA cryptographic node you must remove the CCA software from the coprocessor and re-install the CCA software.
To initialize the access-control system:

1. From the Access Control pull-down menu, select Initialize...; a confirmation dialog box is displayed.
2. Select Yes to confirm; the utility initializes the access-control system.

How to manage cryptographic keys

This section describes how to use the CNM utility to:
- Manage the master keys
- Manage primary key-encrypting keys (KEKs)
- Reset and manage DES and PKA key-storage

Key types are defined as follows:

A **master key** is a special KEK stored in the clear (not enciphered) and kept within the coprocessor secure module. Two kinds of master keys are supported: a DES master key and a PKA master key. Both are used to encipher other keys so that those keys can be stored outside of the secure module. A master key is a 168-bit key formed from three 56-bit parts.

**Primary KEKs** are DES keys shared by cryptographic nodes and are sometimes referred to as transport keys. They are used to encipher other keys shared by the nodes. Primary KEKs, like the master key, are installed from key parts. Knowledge of the key parts can be shared in part by two people to effect a split-knowledge, dual-control security policy.

**Other DES keys and PKA keys** are enciphered keys used to provide cryptographic services, such as MAC keys and private PKA keys.

**Note:** When exchanging clear key-parts, ensure that each party understands how the exchanged data is to be used, since the management of key parts varies among different manufacturers and different encryption products.

How to manage the master keys

A master key is used to encrypt local-node working keys while they are stored external to the coprocessor. CCA defines three master-key registers:

- The **current-master-key register** stores the master key currently used by the coprocessor to encrypt and decrypt local keys
- The **old-master-key register** stores the previous master key and is used to decrypt keys enciphered by that master key
- The **new-master-key register** is an interim location used to store master-key information as accumulated to form a new master-key.

The Support Program uses two sets of master-key registers, one set for ciphering DES (symmetric) keys, and one set for ciphering PKA private (asymmetric) keys.

For information about checking the contents of these registers, see "How to obtain status information" on page 5-8.

**Notes:**

1. Programs that use the CCA API master-key-administration verbs, Master_Key_Process and Master_Key_Distribution, can use a keyword to steer operations to the asymmetric master-key registers, to the symmetric master-key registers, or both sets of master-key registers. The CNM utility uses the BOTH option. If you use another program to load master keys, and if this program
specifically operates on either the symmetric or asymmetric master-key registers, in general you will no longer be able to use the CNM utility to administer master keys.

2. If your installation has multiple cryptographic coprocessors loaded with CCA, you will need to independently administer the master keys in each coprocessor.

3. If your installation has a server with multiple cryptographic coprocessors that are loaded with CCA, those coprocessors will need to be installed with identical master keys.

This section describes how to:
- Verify an existing master key
- Load a master key automatically
- Load a new master key from parts
- Clone a master key

How to verify an existing master key
The utility generates a verification number for each master key stored in the master-key registers. This number identifies the key, but does not reveal information about the actual key value.

To view a master-key-verification number:
1. From the Master Key pull-down menu, select Verify; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select a master-key register; the verification number for the key stored in that register is displayed.

How to load the master key automatically
The CNM utility can auto-set a master key into the coprocessor; its key value cannot be viewed from the utility.

Important: If a master key of unknown value is lost, you cannot recover the keys enciphered under it.

To automatically load the master key:
1. From the Master Key pull-down menu, select Auto Set... or select Random; you are prompted to verify the command.
2. Select Yes; the coprocessor generates and sets a master key.

Notes:
1. Use of Random is preferred since the Auto-Set option passes clear key-parts through host-system memory.
2. When you set or auto-set a master key, you must reencipher all keys enciphered under the former key. See "How to reencipher stored keys" on page 5-20.

How to load a new master key from key parts
To set a new master-key into the coprocessor, load the first, any middle, and the last key parts into the new-master-key register, and then set the new master-key. To effect this:

1. From the Master Key pull-down menu, select Parts; the Load Master Key panel is displayed; see Figure 5-3 on page 5-16.
2. Select the radio button for the key part you are editing (First Part, Middle Part, or Last Part).

3. Enter data by one of the following:
   - Select **New** to clear data entered in error.
   - Select **Open**... to retrieve preexisting data.
   - Select **Generate** to fill the fields with coprocessor-generated random numbers.
   - Manually enter data into the “Master Key Part” fields; each field accepts four hexadecimal digits.

4. Select **Load** to load the key part into the new-master-key register; select **Save**... to save the key part to disk.
   **Important:** Key parts saved to disk are not enciphered. Consider keeping a disk with key parts on it stored in a safe or vault.

   **Note:** When you create a key from parts, you must have both a first part and a last part; middle part(s) are optional.

5. Repeating the preceding steps, load into the new-master-key register the remaining key parts.
   **Note:** For split-knowledge security policy, different people must enter the separate key parts. To enforce a dual-control security policy, the access-control system should assign the right to enter a first key part to one role and the right to enter subsequent key part(s) to another role. Then, authorized users can log on and perform the loading of their respective key part.

6. From the **Master Key** pull-down menu, select **Set**...; the utility transfers the data:
   a. In the current-master-key register to the old-master-key register, and deletes the former old-master key
   b. In the new-master-key register to the current-master-key register

   After setting a new master-key, reencipher the keys that are currently in storage. See “How to reencipher stored keys” on page 5-20.
How to clone a master key

This scenario explains the steps involved in cloning a master key from one coprocessor to another coprocessor. The term cloning is used rather than copying since the master key will be split into shares for transport between the coprocessors. The technique is explained at some length in “Understanding and managing master keys” in Chapter 2 of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors. Appendix D, “Master-key cloning,” on page D-1 provides a step-by-step procedure that you can follow. The material in this chapter provides background information that can permit you to vary the procedure.

Cloning of the master key involves two or three nodes:

• The master-key source node
• The master-key target node
• The “share administration” (SA) node. (The SA node can also be either the source or the target node.)

The CNM utility can store various data items involved in this process in a database that you can carry on diskette or FTP between the different nodes. One database is, by default, known as sa.db and contains the information about the SA key and keys that have been certified. The target node where the master key will be cloned also has a database known by default as the ‘csr.db’.

You can accomplish these tasks using the CNM utility:

1. Set up the nodes in a secure manner with access-control roles and profiles and master keys.

   You will need a role and profile(s) at the source and target nodes for each user who will obtain or store sharei, 1≤i≤n. Processing of sharei, is a separate command so that, if you wish, your roles can insure that independent individuals are involved with obtaining and installing the different shares.

   Consider the use of random master-key generation. Also consider roles that enforce a dual-control security policy; for example, permit one individual/role to register a hash and another individual/role to register a public key, have different individuals/roles for obtaining and installing the individual shares of the master key, and so forth.

   See the guidance portion of Chapter 2 in the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors for the description of the Master_Key_Process and the Master_Key_Distribute verbs.

2. Install a unique 1- to 16-byte Environment ID (EID) of your choice into each node.

   From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Set Environment ID, enter the identifier, and select Load. Use only these characters in an environment identifier (EID): A...Z, a...z, 0...9, and “@” (X’40’), space character (X’20’), “&” (X’26’), and “=” (X’3D’).

   You should enter a full 16-character identifier. For ‘short’ identifiers, complete the entry with space characters.

3. Initialize the master-key-sharing “m” and “n” values in the source and target nodes. These values must be the same in the source and the target nodes. “n” is the maximum number of shares while “m” is the minimum number of shares that must be installed to reconstitute the master key in the target node.

   From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, and then select Set number of shares, enter the values, and select Load.
4. At the different nodes, generate these keys and have each public key certified by the share-administration (SA) key. You can use the utility’s sa.db database to transport the keys and the certificates.

**Share administration (SA)**
This key is used to certify itself and the following keys. You must register the hash of the SA public-key, and the public key itself, in the SA, source, and target nodes.

When the SA key is created, the utility will supply an 8-byte/16-hex-character value that is a portion of the hash of the SA key. **Be sure to retain a copy of this value.** You will need this value to confirm the hash value recorded in the database to register the SA public-key at the source and target nodes.

**Coprocessor Share Signing (CSS)**
This key is used to sign shares distributed from the source node. The private key is retained within the source node.

**Coprocessor Share Receiving (CSR)**
This key is used to receive a share-encrypting key into the target node. The SA-certified public CSR key is used at the source node to wrap (encrypt) the share-encrypting key that is unique for each share. The private key is retained within the target node.

**Generate the Key Pairs: SA, CSS, and CSR**
From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Create Keys, and one of Share Administration Key, CSS key, or CSR key, then select Create.

You also will need to supply key labels for the CSS and CSR keys that are retained in the source and target nodes. For example, 'IBM4764.CLONING.CSS.KEY' and 'IBM4764.CLONING.CSR.KEY'; the labels that you use must not conflict with other key labels used in your applications.

When generating the CSR key at the share-receiving node, also obtain the serial number of the coprocessor. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Status. You must enter the serial-number value when certifying the CSR key.

5. Register the SA public-key in the coprocessor at the SA, source, and target nodes. This is a two-step process that should be done under a dual-control security policy.

One individual should install the SA public-key hash. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Register Share Administration, and select SA key hash. You will enter the hash value obtained during SA key creation.

The other individual should install the actual SA public-key. From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Register Share Administration, and select SA Key. By default, the public-key information is in the sa.db file.

6. Take the CSS key and the CSR key to the SA node and have the keys certified.

From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Certify Keys, and one of CSS key or CSR key.

For the CSR key, you will need to supply the serial number of the target coprocessor as a procedural check that an appropriate key is being certified. Your procedures should include communicating this information in a reliable manner.
7. At the source node, have authorized individuals sign on to the role that permits them to obtain their shares. At least “m” shares must be obtained. These will be shares of the current master-key.

From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Get Share, and select the share number to be obtained. Observe the serial numbers and database identifiers. When these are agreed to be correct, select Get Share. The share information will be placed by default into the csr.db file and will obtain the CSR key-certificate, by default, from the sa.db file.

Obtain current-master-key validation information for use later at the target node. From the Master Key pull-down menu, select Verify, then select Current.

8. At the target node, have authorized individuals sign on to the role that permits each of them to install his or her share. At least “m” shares must be installed to reconstitute the master key into the new-master-key register.

From the Crypto Node pull-down menu, select Share Administration, select Load Share, and select the share number to be installed. Observe the serial numbers and database identifiers, and when these are agreed to be correct, select Install Share. The share information will be obtained by default from the csr.db file and the CSS key certificate will be obtained by default from the sa.db file.

When “m” shares have been loaded, verify that the key in the new-master-key register is the same as the current master-key in the source node (when the shares were obtained). On the target node, from the Master Key pull-down menu, select Verify, then select New.

9. When it is confirmed through master-key verification that the master key has been cloned, an authorized individual can set the master key. This action deletes any old master-key and moves the current master-key to the old-master-key register. Application programs that use keys encrypted by the master key can be impacted by this change, so ensure that setting of the master key is coordinated with the needs of your application programs. From the Master Key pull-down menu, select Set....

Managing key storage

The CNM utility allows basic key-storage management for keys. These utility functions do not form a comprehensive key-management system. Application programs are better suited to perform repetitive key-management tasks.

Key storage is a repository of keys that you access by key label using labels that you or your applications define. DES keys and PKA (RSA) keys are held in separate storage systems. Also, the coprocessor has a very limited internal storage for PKA keys. The coprocessor-stored keys are not considered part of key storage in this discussion.

Note: If your server has multiple cryptographic coprocessors that are loaded with CCA, those coprocessors must have identical master keys installed for key storage to work properly.

This section describes how to:
- Create or initialize key storage
- Reencipher stored keys
- Delete a stored key
- Create a key label
Note: The utility displays a maximum of 1,000 key labels. If you have more than 1,000 key labels in key storage, use an application program to manage them.

How to create or initialize key storage
To create or initialize key storage for your DES or PKA keys:

1. From the Key Storage pull-down menu, select DES Key Storage or PKA Key Storage; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select Initialize; the Initialize DES Key Storage or the Initialize PKA Key Storage panel is displayed.
3. Enter a description for the key-storage file, if desired.
4. Select Initialize; you are prompted to enter a name for the key-storage file.
   Note to Linux users: The location you set for key storage must match the location defined in the CSUDES, CSUDESL, CSUPKADS, and CSUPKALD environment variables. See “How to configure the Support Program” on page 3-2.
   Note to Windows Server 2003 users: The location you enter for key storage must match the information that you provided during loading of the CCA Support Program software. The key storage directory is defined by the KEYDIRECTORY environment variable. The key files are defined by the CSUDES, CSUDESL, CSUPKADS, and CSUPKALD environment variables.
5. Enter a name for the file and save it. The key-storage file is created on the host.

Note: If a file with the same name exists, you are prompted to verify your choice because initializing the key storage modifies the file, and if it had any keys, these would be erased.

How to reencipher stored keys
To reencipher the keys in storage under a new master-key:

1. From the Key Storage pull-down menu, select DES Key Storage or PKA Key Storage; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select Manage; the DES Key Storage Management or the PKA Key Storage Management panel is displayed. The panel lists the labels of the keys in storage.
3. Select Reencipher...; the keys are reenciphered under the key in the current master-key register.

How to delete a stored key
To delete a stored key:

1. From the Key Storage pull-down menu, select DES Key Storage or PKA Key Storage; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select Manage; the DES Key Storage Management or the PKA Key Storage Management panel is displayed. The panel lists the labels of the keys in storage.
   You can set the filter criteria to list a subset of keys within storage. For example, entering “*.mac” as the filter criterion and refreshing the list limits it to keys with labels that end in “.mac”. (The asterisk is a wildcard character.)
3. Highlight the key label for the key to be deleted.
4. Select Delete...; a confirmation dialog box is displayed.
5. Select Yes to confirm; the stored key is deleted.
How to create a key label
To create a key label:

1. From the Key Storage pull-down menu, select DES Key Storage or PKA Key Storage; a submenu is displayed.
2. From the submenu, select Manage; the DES Key Storage Management or the PKA Key Storage Management panel is displayed. The panel lists the labels of the keys in storage.
   You can set the filter criteria to list a subset of keys within storage. For example, entering “*.mac” as the filter criterion and refreshing the list limits it to keys with labels that end in “.mac”. (The asterisk is a wildcard character.)
3. Select New; you are prompted to enter a key label.
4. Select Load; the key label is loaded into storage.

How to create and store primary DES KEKs

Key-encrypting keys (KEKs) are encrypted under the master key and stored in key storage for local use. Key parts used to create a KEK can be randomly generated or entered as clear information. The parts can also be saved to disk or diskette in the clear for transport to other nodes or for re-creating the local KEK.

Note: The CNM utility only supports DES KEKs for the transport of keys between nodes. Applications can use the CCA API to furnish the services needed for public-key-based key distribution.

To work with a KEK (or other double-length operational key):

1. From the Keys pull-down menu, select Primary DES Key-Encrypting Keys; the Primary DES Key-Encrypting Keys panel is displayed.
2. At any time you can select New to clear all data fields and reset all the radio buttons to their default settings.
3. Select the radio button for the desired key-part to be entered: First Part, Middle Part, or Last Part.
4. Enter data in the Key Part fields by using one of the following processes:
   - Select Open... to retrieve pre-existing Key Part, Control Vector, and Key Label data previously stored on disk using the Save... command.
   - Select Generate to fill the Key Part fields with coprocessor-generated random numbers.
   - Manually enter data into the Key Part fields; each of the Key Part fields accepts four hexadecimal digits.
5. Select a control vector for the key:
   - To use a default KEK control-vector, select the appropriate Default Importer or Default Exporter radio button.
   - To use a custom control-vector, select the Custom radio button. In the Control Vector fields, enter the left or right half of a control vector for any double-length key. Note that the key-part bit (bit 44) must be on and that each byte of the control vector must have even parity. For detailed information about control vectors, refer to Appendix C of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.
6. Enter a key label to identify the key token in key storage.
7. Select Load to load the key part into the coprocessor and store the resulting key token into key storage; select Save... to save the unencrypted Key Part and its associated Control Vector and Key Label values to disk.
8. **Save** to disk or **Load** to key storage the remaining key-part information by following Step 3 on page 5-21 to Step 7 on page 5-21. Be sure to use the same key label for each part of a single key.

## Using the CNI utility to establish other nodes

By creating a CNI list for the CCA Node Initialization (CNI) utility, you can load keys and access-control data stored on disk into other cryptographic nodes without running the CNM utility on those target nodes.

To set up a node using the CNI utility:

1. Start the CNM utility on an established node.
2. Save to the host or portable media (like a diskette) the access-control data and keys you want to install on other nodes. When you run the CNI utility on the target node (Step 10), it searches the identical directory path for each file. For example:
   - If you save a user profile to the established node directory `c:\IBM4764\profiles`, the CNI utility will search the target node directory `c:\IBM4764\profiles`.
   - If you save a user profile to the diskette directory `a:\profiles`, the CNI utility will search the target node directory `a:\profiles`.
3. From the **File** pull-down menu, select **CNI Editor**; the CCA Node Initialization Editor panel is displayed. See **Figure 5-4**.

![CCA Node Management Utility - CCA Node Initialization Editor](image)

**Figure 5-4. CCA Node Initialization Editor panel**

The list in the top portion of the panel displays the functions able to be added to the CNI list; the bottom portion lists the functions included in the current CNI list. The CNI list can perform the following functions:

- Select the active card
- Logon to and logoff of the cryptographic node
- Initialize the cryptographic facility (coprocessor)
- Initialize access control facility
- Auto set the master key
- Clear the new master key register
- Load master key parts
- Set the master key
- Load or delete user roles and user profiles
- Synchronize the clock calendars
- Initialize storage for DES keys and PKA keys

4. Add the functions you want. To add a function to the CNI list:
   a. Highlight it.
   b. Select **Add**; the function is added to the CNI list.

   **Note:** If the function you choose loads a data object—like a key part, key-storage file, user profile, or role—you are prompted to enter the file name or the ID of the object to be loaded.

5. Using the **Move Up** and **Move Down** buttons, organize the functions to reflect the same order you follow when using the CNM utility. For example, if you are loading access-control data, you must first log on as a user with the authority to load access-control data.

6. Select **Verify** to confirm that objects have been created correctly.

7. Select **Save...**; you are prompted to choose a name and directory location for the CNI-list file.

8. Save the CNI-list file; the list file *does not* contain the data objects specified in the CNI list.

9. Copy the files needed by the CNI utility onto target host directory locations that mirror their location on the source host. If you saved the files to portable media, insert the media into the target node.

10. From the target node, run the list using the CNI utility:
    - On Linux systems:
      a. Change directory to `/opt/IBM/4764/cnm`
      b. Enter `csulcni listfile_name` on the command line
    - On Windows Server 2003 systems:
      a. Change directory to `\program files\ibm\4764\cnm`
      b. Enter `csuncni listfile_name` on the command line

If the CNI list includes a logon, enter `csulcni` or `csuncni` on the command line (without specifying a filename). The utility Help text describes the syntax for entering an ID and passphrase.

The CNI utility loads files to the coprocessor from the host or portable media, as specified by the CNI list.
Chapter 6. Building applications to use with the CCA API

This chapter includes the following:

- An overview of the way in which applications obtain service from the Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) application program interface (API)
- The procedure for calling a CCA verb in the C programming language
- The procedure for compiling applications and linking them to the CCA API
- A sample routine written in the C programming language
- Enhancing throughput with CCA and the 4764

Source code for the sample routine is shipped with the software. You can use the sample included to test the coprocessor and the Support Program.

Note: The file locations referenced in this chapter are the default directory paths.

Overview

Application and utility programs issue service requests to the cryptographic coprocessor by calling the CCA API verbs. The Windows environment links CCA API requests to its dynamic link library (DLL) code, and Linux links requests to its shared object code. The operating system code in turn calls the coprocessor physical device driver (PDD). The hardware and software accessed through the API are themselves an integrated subsystem.

Verb calls are written in the standard syntax of the C programming language, and include an entry_point_name, verb parameters, and the variables for those parameters. The same entry-point name, parameters, and variables are used in Linux and Windows environments, so code can be ported between them with minimal change.

For a detailed listing of the verbs, variables, and parameters you can use when programming for the CCA API, refer to the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.

How to call CCA verbs in C program syntax

In every operating system environment, you can code CCA API verb calls using standard C programming language syntax.

Function call prototypes for all CCA API verbs are contained in a header file. The files and their default distribution locations are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Header File Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linux</td>
<td>/opt/IBM/4764/include/csulincl.h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>\Program Files\IBM\4764\include\csunincl.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To include these verb declarations, use the following compiler directive in your program:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Directive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linux</td>
<td>#include &quot;csulincl.h&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>#include &quot;csunincl.h&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When you issue a call to a CCA API verb, code the verb entry-point name in uppercase characters. Separate the parameter identifiers with commas and enclose them in parentheses. End the call with a semicolon character. For example:

---

1. The term verb implies an action that an application program can initiate. Some systems and publications use the term callable service.
CSNBCKI (&return_code,
&reason_code,
&exit_data_length, /* exit_data_length */
exit_data, /* exit_data */
clear_key,
key_token);

**Note:** The third and fourth parameters of a CCA call, `exit_data_length` and `exit_data`, are not currently supported by the Support Program. Although it is permissible to code null address pointers for these parameters, it is recommended that you specify a long integer valued to 0 with the `exit_data_length` parameter.

---

### How to compile and link CCA application programs

The Support Program includes the C Language source code and the make file for a sample program. The file and its default distribution location is:

- **Linux**: `/opt/IBM/4764/samples`
- **Windows**: `\Program Files\IBM\4764\samples`

Compile application programs that use CCA and link the compiled programs to the CCA library. The library and its default distribution location is:

- **Linux**: `/usr/lib/libcsulsapi.so`
- **Windows**: `\Program Files\IBM\4764\lib\csunsapi.lib`

---

### Sample routine

To illustrate the practical application of CCA verb calls, this section describes the sample routine included with the Support Program. For reference, a hard copy of the sample routine is shown in Figure 6-1 on page 6-3. (There is also a sample program on the product Web site. That sample program can help you understand the performance of the CCA implementation.)

The sample routine generates a message authentication code (MAC) on a text string and then verifies the MAC. To effect this, the routine:

1. Calls the Key_Generate (CSNBKGN) verb to create a MAC/MACVER key pair.
2. Calls the MAC_Generate (CSNBMGN) verb to generate a MAC on a text string with the MAC key.
3. Calls the MAC_Verify (CSNBMVR) verb to verify the text string MAC with the MACVER key.

As you review the sample routine shown in Figure 6-1 on page 6-3, refer to the *IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide* for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors for descriptions of the called verbs and their parameters. These verbs are listed in Table 6-1.

**Table 6-1. Verbs called by the sample routine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Entry-point name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key_Generate</td>
<td>CSNBKGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC_Generate</td>
<td>CSNBMGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC_Verify</td>
<td>CSNBMVR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6-1. Syntax, sample routine (Part 1 of 5)
This example program:

1) Calls the Key_Generate verb (CSNBKGN) to create a MAC (message authentication code) key token and a MACVER key token.

2) Calls the MAC_Generate verb (CSNBMGN) using the MAC key token from step 1 to generate a MAC on the supplied text string (INPUT_TEXT).

3) Calls the MAC_Verify verb (CSNBMVR) to verify the MAC for the same text string, using the MACVER key token created in step 1.

---

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef _AIX
#include <csufincl.h>
#elif __WINDOWS__
#include "csunincl.h"
#else
#include "csulincl.h" /* else linux */
#endif

#define KEY_FORM "OPOP"
#define KEY_LENGTH "SINGLE "
#define KEY_TYPE_1 "MAC "
#define KEY_TYPE_2 "MACVER "
#define INPUT_TEXT "abcdefhgijklmn0987654321"
#define MAC_PROCESSING_RULE "X9.9-1 "
#define SEGMENT_FLAG "ONLY "
#define MAC_LENGTH "HEX-9 "
#define MAC_BUFFER_LENGTH 10

void main()
{
    static long return_code;
    static long reason_code;
    static unsigned char key_form[4];
    static unsigned char key_length[8];
    static unsigned char mac_key_type[8];
    static unsigned char macver_key_type[8];
    static unsigned char kek_key_id_1[64];
    static unsigned char kek_key_id_2[64];
    static unsigned char mac_key_id[64];
    static unsigned char macver_key_id[64];
    static long text_length;
    static unsigned char text[26];
    static long rule_array_count;
    static unsigned char rule_array[3][8]; /* Max 3 rule array elements */
    static unsigned char chaining_vector[18];
    static unsigned char mac_value[MAC_BUFFER_LENGTH];

    /* Print a banner */
    printf("Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program example program.

Figure 6-1. Syntax, sample routine (Part 2 of 5)

6-4 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor CCA Support Program, Release 3.24, October 2005
/* Set up initial values for Key_Generate call */
return_code = 0;
reason_code = 0;
memcpy (key_form, KEY_FORM, 4); /* OPOP key pair */
memcpy (key_length, KEY_LENGTH, 8); /* Single-length keys */
memcpy (mac_key_type, KEY_TYPE_1, 8); /* 1st token, MAC key type */
memcpy (macver_key_type, KEY_TYPE_2, 8); /* 2nd token, MACVER key type */
memset (kek_key_id_1, 0x00, sizeof(kek_key_id_1)); /* 1st KEK not used */
memset (kek_key_id_2, 0x00, sizeof(kek_key_id_2)); /* 2nd KEK not used */
memset (mac_key_id, 0x00, sizeof(mac_key_id)); /* Init 1st key token */
memset (macver_key_id, 0x00, sizeof(macver_key_id)); /* Init 2nd key token */

/* Generate a MAC/MACVER operational key pair */
CSNBKGN(&return_code,
&reason_code,
NULL, /* exit_data_length */
NULL, /* exit_data */
key_form,
key_length,
mac_key_type,
macver_key_type,
kek_key_id_1,
kek_key_id_2,
mac_key_id,
macver_key_id);

/* Check the return/reason codes. Terminate if there is an error. */
if (return_code != 0 || reason_code != 0) {
    printf("Key_Generate failed: "); /* Print failing verb */
    printf("return_code = %ld, " , return_code); /* Print return code */
    printf("reason_code = %ld\n", reason_code); /* Print reason code */
    return;
} else
    printf("Key_Generate successful.\n");

Figure 6-1. Syntax, sample routine (Part 3 of 5)
/* Set up initial values for MAC_Generate call */
return_code = 0;
reason_code = 0;
text_length = sizeof (INPUT_TEXT) - 1; /* Length of MAC text */
memcpy (text, INPUT_TEXT, text_length); /* Define MAC input text */
rule_array_count = 3; /* 3 rule array elements */
memset (rule_array, ' ', sizeof(rule_array)); /* Clear rule array */
memcpy (rule_array[0], MAC_PROCESSING_RULE, 8); /* 1st rule array element */
memcpy (rule_array[1], SEGMENT_FLAG, 8); /* 2nd rule array element */
memcpy (rule_array[2], MAC_LENGTH, 8); /* 3rd rule array element */
memset (chaining_vector, 0x00, 18); /* Clear chaining vector */
memset (mac_value, 0x00, sizeof(mac_value)); /* Clear MAC value */

/* Generate a MAC based on input text */
CSNBMGN ( &return_code,
            &reason_code,
            NULL, /* exit_data_length */
            NULL, /* exit_data */
            mac_key_id, /* Output from Key_Generate */
            text,
            &text_length,
            &rule_array_count,
            &rule_array[0][0],
            chaining_vector,
            mac_value);

/* Check the return/reason codes. Terminate if there is an error. */
if (return_code != 0 || reason_code != 0) {
    printf ("MAC Generate Failed: "); /* Print failing verb */
    printf ("return_code = %ld, ", return_code); /* Print return code */
    printf ("reason_code = %ld.
", reason_code); /* Print reason code */
    return;
} else {
    printf ("MAC_Generate successful.
");
    printf ("MAC_value = %s\n", mac_value); /* Print MAC value (HEX-9) */
}

Figure 6-1. Syntax, sample routine (Part 4 of 5)
/* Set up initial values for MAC_Verify call */
return_code = 0;
reason_code = 0;
rule_array_count = 1; /* 1 rule array element */
memset (rule_array, '\0', sizeof(rule_array)); /* Clear rule array */
memcpy (rule_array[0], MAC_LENGTH, 8); /* Rule array element */
/* (use default Ciphering */
/* Method and Segmenting */
/* Control */
memset (chaining_vector, 0x00, 18); /* Clear the chaining vector */

/* Verify MAC value */
CSNBMV (return_code, 
reason_code, 
NULL, /* exit_data_length */
NULL, /* exit_data */
macver_key_id, /* Output from Key_Generate */
&text_length, /* Same as for MAC_Generate */
text, /* Same as for MAC_Generate */
&rule_array_count, 
&rule_array[0][0], 
chaining_vector, 
mac_value); /* Output from MAC_Generate */

/* Check the return/reason codes. Terminate if there is an error. */
if (return_code != 0 || reason_code != 0) {
    printf ("MAC_Verify failed: "); /* Print failing verb */
    printf ("return_code = \%ld, \%ld"," return_code); /* Print return code */
    printf ("reason_code = \%ld\n", reason_code); /* Print reason code */
    return;
} else /* No error occurred */
    printf ("MAC_Verify successful.\n");

Figure 6-1. Syntax, sample routine (Part 5 of 5)

Enhancing throughput with CCA and the 4764 coprocessor

When you use the CCA API, the characteristics of your host application program will affect performance and throughput of the 4764. There are two areas you should understand in order to evaluate performance and design your application to obtain the best performance from the 4764 coprocessor. One is multi-threading and multiprocessing, and the other is caching DES and PKA keys.

Multi-threading and multiprocessing

The CCA application running inside the 4764 can process several CCA requests simultaneously. The coprocessor contains several independent hardware elements, including the RSA engine, DES engine, CPU, random-number generator, and PCI-X communications interface. These elements can all be working at the same time, processing parts of different CCA verbs. By working on several verbs at the same time, the coprocessor can keep all of its hardware elements busy, maximizing the overall system throughput.

In order to take advantage of this capability, your host system must send multiple CCA requests to the coprocessor without waiting for each one to finish before sending the next one. The best way to accomplish this is to design a multi-threaded host application program, in which each thread can independently send CCA requests to the coprocessor. For example, a Web server can start a new thread for each request it receives over the network. Each of these threads will send the
required cryptographic requests to the coprocessor, independent of what the other threads are doing. By doing this, you guarantee that the coprocessor is not under-utilized. Another option is to have several independent host application programs all using the coprocessor at the same time.

Caching DES and PKA keys

The CCA software for the 4764 keeps copies of recently used DES and PKA keys in caches, inside the secure module. The keys are stored in a form that has been decrypted, validated, and is ready for use. If the same key is reused in a later CCA request, the 4764 can use the cached copy and avoid the overhead associated with decrypting and validating the key token. In addition, for retained PKA keys, the cache eliminates the overhead of retrieving the key from the internal flash EPROM memory.

As a result, applications that reuse a common set of keys can run much faster than those which use different keys for each transaction. Most common applications use a common set of DES keys and PKA private-keys, and the caching is very effective in improving throughput. PKA public-keys, which have very little processing overhead, are not cached.
Appendix A. Initial DEFAULT-role commands

This appendix describes the characteristics of the DEFAULT role after the coprocessor is initialized and when no other access-control data exists:

- The role ID is DEFAULT
- The required authentication strength is zero
- It is valid at all times of the day and on all days of the week
- The only functions permitted are those necessary to load access-control data

**Important**

The cryptographic node is not secure when unauthenticated users can load access-control data using the DEFAULT role. Restrict these commands to selected supervisory roles.

Table A-1 lists the access-control commands enabled in the DEFAULT role when the CCA software is initially loaded and when the CCA node is initialized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Command name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X'0107'</td>
<td>One-Way Hash, SHA-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0110'</td>
<td>Set Clock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0111'</td>
<td>Reinitialize Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0112'</td>
<td>Initialize Access-Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0113'</td>
<td>Change User Profile Expiration Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0114'</td>
<td>Change User Profile Authentication Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0115'</td>
<td>Reset User Profile Logon-Attempt-Failure Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0116'</td>
<td>Read Public Access-Control Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0117'</td>
<td>Delete User Profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0118'</td>
<td>Delete Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0119'</td>
<td>Load Function-Control Vector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'011A'</td>
<td>Clear Function-Control Vector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Machine-readable-log contents

The CLU utility creates two log files, one intended for reading and the other for possible input to a program. This latter log file, the machine-readable log or MRL file, contains the binary outputs from the coprocessor in response to various commands input to the coprocessor.

Appendix C. Device driver error codes

Each time that the coprocessor is reset, and the reset is not caused by a fault or tamper event, the coprocessor runs through Miniboot, its power-on self-test (POST), code-loading, and status routines. During this process, the coprocessor attempts to coordinate with a host-system device driver. Coprocessor resets can occur because of power-on, a reset command sent from the device driver, or because of coprocessor internal activity such as completion of code updates.

The coprocessor's fault or tamper-detection circuitry can also reset the coprocessor.

The coprocessor device driver monitors the status of its communication with the coprocessor and the coprocessor hardware-status registers. Programs such as the coprocessor Load Utility (CLU) and the CCA Support Program can receive unusual status in the form of a 4-byte return code from the device driver.

There are a very large number of possible 4-byte codes, all of which are of the form X'8xxxxxxx'. The most likely codes that might be encountered are described in Table C-1 on page C-2. If you encounter codes of the form X'8340xxxx' or X'8440xxxx', and the code is not in the Table, contact the IBM Crypto Team for advice via email from the Support page on the IBM product Web site (http://www.ibm.com/security/cryptocards).
### Table C-1. Device driver error codes in the class X'8xxxxxxx'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-byte return code (hex)</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8040FFBF</td>
<td>External intrusion</td>
<td>Arises due to optional electrical connection to the coprocessor. This condition can be reset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFDA</td>
<td>Dead battery</td>
<td>The batteries have been allowed to run out of sufficient power, or have been removed. The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFDB</td>
<td>X-ray tamper or dead battery</td>
<td>The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFDF</td>
<td>X-ray or dead battery</td>
<td>The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFEB</td>
<td>Temperature tamper</td>
<td>High or low temperature limit has been exceeded. The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFF3</td>
<td>Voltage tamper</td>
<td>The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FF9F</td>
<td>Mesh tamper</td>
<td>The coprocessor is zeroized and is no longer functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFFB</td>
<td>Reset bit is on</td>
<td>Either low voltage was detected, the internal operating temperature of the coprocessor went out of limits, or the host driver sent a reset command. Try removing and reinstalling the coprocessor into the PCI-X bus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8040FFFE</td>
<td>Battery warning</td>
<td>Battery power is marginal. The battery changing procedure described in the <em>IBM 4764 Cryptographic Coprocessor Installation Manual</em> should be followed to replace the batteries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804xxxx (for example, 80400005)</td>
<td>General communication problem</td>
<td>Except for the prior X'8040xxxx' codes, there are additional conditions that arise in host-coprocessor communication. Determine that the host system in fact has a coprocessor. Try removing and reinstalling the coprocessor into the PCI-X bus. Run the CLU status command (ST). If problem persists, contact IBM Crypto Support via the Web site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8340xxxx</td>
<td>Miniboot-0 codes</td>
<td>This class of return code arises from the lowest-level of reset testing. If codes in this class occur, contact IBM Crypto Support via the Web site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8340038F</td>
<td>Random-number generation fault</td>
<td>Continuous monitoring of the random-number generator has detected a possible problem. There is a small statistical probability of this event occurring without indicating an actual ongoing problem. The CLU status (ST) command should be run at least twice to determine if the condition can be cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8440xxxx</td>
<td>Miniboot-1 codes</td>
<td>This class of return code arises from the replaceable POST and code-loading code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>844006B2</td>
<td>Invalid signature</td>
<td>The signature on the data sent from the CLU utility to Miniboot could not be validated by Miniboot. Be sure that you are using an appropriate file (for example, CR1xxxxx.clu versus CE1xxxxx.clu). If the problem persists, obtain the output of a CLU status report and forward this and a description of what you are trying to accomplish to IBM Crypto Support via the Web site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D. Master-key cloning

This appendix includes:

- A procedure that outlines how to clone a master key from one coprocessor to another coprocessor using the CNM utility
- Access-control considerations when cloning

Master-key cloning procedure

The following procedure outlines how to clone a master key from one coprocessor to another coprocessor using the CNM utility. Before using this procedure, you should familiarize yourself with the material presented at "How to clone a master key" on page 5-17 and “Understanding and Managing Master Keys” in Chapter 2 of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.

The master-key cloning procedure that follows makes no assumption about which computer contains the coprocessors used for:

- Share administration (“SA node”)
- Master-key source (“CSS” coprocessor Share-Signing node)
- Master-key target (“CSR” coprocessor Share-Receiving node)

The SA key can reside in the same coprocessor as either the CSS or the CSR key, or it can reside in a separate coprocessor node. Any of the coprocessors can reside together in the same computer if multiple coprocessors with CCA are available.

The procedure ignores operator actions to:

- Log on and log off, as these steps depend on the specific roles in use at your installation
- Switch between coprocessors when you are using more than one coprocessor within a computer
The procedure is broken down into several phases as outlined in Table D-1.

**Table D-1. Master-key cloning procedure phase overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Establish the Share Administration node; create the SA database, generate the SA key, and store its public key and hash into the SA database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Establish the source node; generate the &quot;CSS&quot; key and add the public key to the SA database; install the SA public-key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Certify the CSS key and store the certificate into the SA database.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each target node, repeat phase 3 procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Establish the target node; create a CSR database, generate a &quot;CSR&quot; key, and add the public key to the CSR database for this node; install the SA public-key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Certify the CSR key and store the certificate into the CSR database for the target node.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Obtain shares and current master-key-verification information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Install shares and confirm new master-key; set the master key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before undertaking the master-key cloning procedure, it is recommended that you complete the forms found on the following pages.

**Table D-2. Cloning responsibilities, profiles and roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsible individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit access controls</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate SA key</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA-key hash</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA key</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit access controls</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate CSS key</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain CSS master key</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA-key hash</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA key</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certify CSS key</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit access controls</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate CSR key</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA-key hash</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA key</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certify CSR1 key</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain shares</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install shares</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify CSR new</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set CSR master-key</td>
<td>CSR1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit access controls</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate CSR key</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-2. Cloning responsibilities, profiles and roles (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsible individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Register SA-key hash</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register SA key</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certify CSR2 key</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain shares</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install shares</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify CSR new</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set CSR master-key</td>
<td>CSR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Audit the appropriateness of the access controls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure D-1. Cloning-information worksheet

Phase 1: Establish the share administration node

Using the coprocessor designated as the Share Administration (SA) node, follow the steps in Table D-3. Note that this coprocessor can also serve as the master-key source or a master-key target node.

Table D-3. Master-key cloning procedure: establish SA node

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Audit the appropriateness of the access controls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-3. Master-key cloning procedure: establish SA node (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Perform time synchronization and insure that the authorization (fcv_td2k.crt) is installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Confirm (or install) the master key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Using the facilities of your operating system, erase any prior SA database from the SA database media.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.5  | If not already established, enter the Environment ID (EID):  
• Crypto Node, Set Environment ID.  
• Enter the EID, Load. |
| 1.6  | Generate the SA key:  
• Crypto Node, Share Administration, Create Keys, Share Administration Key.  
• Accept the default SA public-key and private-key labels, and enter the location and name of the SA database (“sa.db”).  
• Create.  
• Record the SA-key hash value for use later in the procedure. |
| 1.7  | Register the SA public-key hash:  
• Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration Key, SA-Key Hash.  
• Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.  
• Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default).  
• Enter the SA-key hash, Register. |
| 1.8  | Register the SA public-key:  
• Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration, SA Key.  
• Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.  
• Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default), Register. |

Phase 2: Establish the source node

Using the coprocessor designated as the master-key source node, follow the steps in Table D-4. Note that this coprocessor can also serve as the SA node.

Table D-4. Master-key cloning procedure: establish source (CSS) node

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2a.1</td>
<td>Audit the appropriateness of the access controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a.2</td>
<td>Perform time synchronization and insure that the authorization (fcv_td2k.crt) is installed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2a.3 | Confirm the coprocessor serial number:  
• Crypto Node, Status.  
• Adapter.  
• Note the coprocessor serial number, Cancel. |
| 2a.4 | Confirm (or install) the master key. |
| 2a.5 | Obtain the current master-key-verification information:  
• Master Key, Verify, Current.  
• Save to transport media, Cancel. |
| 2a.6 | If not already established, enter the Environment ID (EID):  
• Crypto Node, Set Environment ID.  
• Enter the EID, Load. |
| 2a.7 | If not already established, set the number of shares values, “m” and “n”:  
• Crypto Node, Share Administration, Set Number of Shares.  
• Set the maximum and minimum number of required shares, Load. |
### Table D-4. Master-key cloning procedure: establish source (CSS) node (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2a.8  | Generate the CSS key:  
|       | • Crypto Node, Share Administration, Create Keys, CSS Key.  
|       | • Enter the CSS key label (for example, “CSS.KEY”).  
|       | • Confirm the coprocessor serial number.  
|       | • Confirm or enter the SA database name and location.  
|       | • Create. |
| 2a.9  | Register the SA public-key hash:  
|       | • Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration Key, SA-Key Hash.  
|       | • Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.  
|       | • Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default).  
|       | • Enter the SA-key hash, Register. |
| 2a.10 | Register the SA public-key:  
|       | • Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration, SA Key.  
|       | • Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.  
|       | • Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default), Register. |

### Phase 3: Establish target node and clone master key

Using the designated nodes, establish the target node and clone the master key following the steps in Table D-5. Note that this coprocessor can also serve as the SA node.

### Table D-5. Master-key cloning procedure: establish CSR node, clone master key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a.1</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Audit the appropriateness of the access controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a.2</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Perform time synchronization and insure that the authorization (fcv_td2k.crt) is installed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3a.3  | Target | Confirm the coprocessor serial number:  
|       |       | • Crypto Node, Status.  
|       |       | • Adapter.  
|       |       | • Note the coprocessor serial number, Cancel. |
| 3a.4  | Target | Ensure the existence of a (temporary) master key. |
| 3a.5  | Target | If not already established, enter the Environment ID (EID):  
|       |       | • Crypto Node, Set Environment ID.  
|       |       | • Enter the EID (for example, “CSR1 NODE” and extend with spaces to 16 entered characters).  
|       |       | • Load. |
| 3a.6  | Target | If not already established, set the number of shares values, “m” and “n”:  
|       |       | • Crypto Node, Share Administration, Set Number of Shares.  
|       |       | • Set the maximum and minimum number of required shares.  
|       |       | • Load. |
Table D-5. Master-key cloning procedure: establish CSR node, clone master key (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a.7</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Using the facilities of your operating system, erase the csr.db data file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a.8</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Generate the CSR key: &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Crypto Node, Share Administration, Create Keys, CSR Key.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the CSR key label (for example, “CSR1.KEY”).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Confirm the coprocessor serial number.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Select the key size.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Provide the CSR database name and location (for example, “CSR1.DB”).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Create.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a.9</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Register the SA public-key hash: &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration, SA-Key Hash.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the SA-key hash, Register.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a.10</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Register the SA public-key: &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Crypto Node, Share Administration, Register Share Administration Key, SA Key&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the SA database file name and location, Next.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Enter the SA public-key label (or accept the default), Register.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-5. Master-key cloning procedure: establish CSR node, clone master key (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the SA node...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b.1</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Certify the CSS key (as required):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Crypto Node, Share Administration, Certify Keys, CSS Key.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enter the name and path for the SA database, <em>Next.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirm the CSS key label, the coprocessor serial number, and the SA Environment ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Certify.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b.2</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Certify the CSR key:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Crypto Node, Share Administration, Certify Keys, CSR Key.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enter the name and path for the SA and CSR databases, <em>Next.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirm the SA key label, CSR key label, and the SA Environment ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enter the CSR serial number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Certify.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the source node...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c.1</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Obtain at least “m” of “n” shares. Perform the following for each share. Note that logon and logoff might be required to obtain each share.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Crypto Node, Share Administration, Get Share.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Select the share. Note that if you are obtaining an additional set(s) of shares, the &quot;Distributed&quot; messages might not be meaningful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enter the name and path for the SA and CSR databases, <em>Next.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirm the CSS key label, CSS coprocessor serial number, and the CSR coprocessor serial number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Get Share.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Repeat as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-5. Master-key cloning procedure: establish CSR node, clone master key (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3d.1  | Target | Install “m” (of “n”) shares. Perform the following for each share and observe the response. The response indicates when enough shares have been installed to form the new master-key. Note that logon and logoff might be required to install each share.  
  • **Crypto Node, Share Administration, Load Share.**  
  • Select the share.  
  • Enter the name and path for the CSR and SA databases, *Next*.  
  • Confirm the CSS key label, the CSS coprocessor serial number, and the CSR coprocessor serial number.  
  • *Load Share.*  
  
  Observe the response. Loading sufficient shares completes the new master-key.  
  Repeat as required. |
| 3d.2  | Target | Confirm the new master-key:  
  • **Master Key, Verify, New.**  
  • *Compare*, select the file, *OK*, *Cancel* |
| 3d.3  | Target | Using the facilities of your operating system, erase the csr.db data file. This is not a security issue but rather to avoid complications should you perform another master-key cloning operation. |
| 3d.4  | Target | As appropriate, set the master key:  
  • **Master Key, Set**  
  • *OK* |

### Access-control considerations when cloning

There are three classes of roles to consider for cloning operations:

- Roles at the share-administration node
- Roles at the source node, CSS
- Roles at the target node, CSR

You must also consider your security policy.

Your security policy must define who will have the authority to:

- Generate a random master-key at the source node.
- Set the master key, the action which brings a new master key into operation. Note that keys enciphered by the master key will need to be updated to the changed master key; you need to plan for this action and which role will provide this authority.
Generate the retained RSA keys to certify the public keys of the source and target nodes (the SA key), and to generate the retained keys at the source (CSS) and target (CSR) nodes.

- Register the SA key and its hash, and if this will be a split responsibility.

In addition, it must be decided how many individuals must cooperate to clone a master key; of course, they must be selected to avoid collusion.

In deciding the “m” and “n” values, you must consider when the cloning will take place and if there is the need to reconstitute the master key from a fewer number of shares than the total number obtained from the source node (perhaps because of share-corruption or the unavailability of one or more individuals who can obtain or install a share).

**Note:** The CNM utility places all of the shares from a node into the CSR.DB file. Each share is encrypted under a unique, triple-length DES key which itself is encrypted by the CSR public key of the target node.

The CNM utility places all of the shares from a node into the CSR.DB file.

![Table D-6](image)

### Table D-6. CCA commands related to master-key cloning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Command name</th>
<th>Verb name</th>
<th>Consideration / role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X'001A'</td>
<td>Set Master Key</td>
<td>Master_Key_Process</td>
<td>Critical, must be knowledgeable of the contents of the new master-key register and the implications of a master-key change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'001D'</td>
<td>Compute Verification Pattern</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0020'</td>
<td>Generate Random Master Key</td>
<td>Master_Key_Process</td>
<td>Not critical except that it fills the new master-key register.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0032'</td>
<td>Clear New Master Key Register</td>
<td>Master_Key_Process</td>
<td>Probably assigned to the role that can set the master key. This can override the collected shares. Probably should be mutually exclusive with the Generate Random Master Key command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0033'</td>
<td>Clear Old Master Key Register</td>
<td>Master_Key_Process</td>
<td>Generally not used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'008E'</td>
<td>Generate Key</td>
<td>Key_Generate</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0090'</td>
<td>Reencipher to Current Master Key</td>
<td>Key_Token Change</td>
<td>Consider who will update working keys encrypted by the master key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0100'</td>
<td>PKA96 Digital Signature Generate</td>
<td>Digital_Signature_Generate</td>
<td>Certifier of the SA, CSS, and CSR keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0101'</td>
<td>PKA96 Digital Signature Verify</td>
<td>Digital_Signature_Verify</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0102'</td>
<td>PKA96 Key Token Change</td>
<td>PKA_Key_Token_Change</td>
<td>Consider who will update working keys encrypted by the master key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0103'</td>
<td>PKA96 PKA Key Generate</td>
<td>PKA_Key_Generate</td>
<td>Required to generate the SA, CSS, and CSR keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0107'</td>
<td>One-Way Hash, SHA-1</td>
<td>One_Way_Hash</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-6. CCA commands related to master-key cloning (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Command name</th>
<th>Verb name</th>
<th>Consideration / role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X'0114'</td>
<td>Change User Profile Authentication Data</td>
<td>Access_Control_Initialization</td>
<td>Allows changing the passphrase in ANY profile; use with discretion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0116'</td>
<td>Read Public Access-Control Information</td>
<td>Access_Control_Maintenance</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'011C'</td>
<td>Set EID</td>
<td>Cryptographic_Facility_Control</td>
<td>Needed to set up the CSS and CSR nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'011D'</td>
<td>Initialize Master Key Cloning</td>
<td>Cryptographic_Facility_Control</td>
<td>Needed to set up the “m-of-n” values at the CSS and CSR nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0200'</td>
<td>PKA Register Public Key Hash</td>
<td>PKA_Public_Key_Hash_Register</td>
<td>Use at the CSS and CSR nodes to ensure the SA key can be recognized; split responsibility with X'0201'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0201'</td>
<td>PKA Public Key Register with Cloning</td>
<td>PKA_Public_Key_Register</td>
<td>Use at the CSS and CSR nodes to ensure the SA key can be recognized; split responsibility with X'0200'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0203'</td>
<td>Delete Retained Key</td>
<td>Retained_Key_Delete</td>
<td>Use to remove obsolete SA, CSS, and CSR keys; be careful about denial of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0204'</td>
<td>PKA Clone Key Generate</td>
<td>PKA_Key_Generate</td>
<td>Needed to generate the CSS and CSR keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0211' - X'021F'</td>
<td>Clone-info (Share) Obtain</td>
<td>Master_Key_Distribution</td>
<td>Consider a profile and role for each share to enforce split responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0221' - X'022F'</td>
<td>Clone-info (Share) Install</td>
<td>Master_Key_Distribution</td>
<td>Consider a profile and role for each share to enforce split responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X'0230'</td>
<td>List Retained Key</td>
<td>Retained_Key_List</td>
<td>All.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server

This appendix addresses threats which should be considered when employing the IBM 4764 with the Support Program in a digital-signing application. Much of the discussion is applicable to other environments in which you might apply the coprocessor.

An organization placing a certification authority (CA), registration authority (RA), Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder, or time-stamping service into operation should consider how their installation will address various threats. Table E-1 on page E-2 lists potential threats and presents product design and implementation solutions to many of these threats. Notes© are included describing steps that you should consider to further mitigate your exposure to problems.

For the case of a digital-signing server, Appendix H of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors describes actions you should use in deploying the coprocessor, policies you should consider, application functionality which should be included, and so forth.

Plan to re-read the contents of Table E-1 after you have made first-pass decisions about your installation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats associated with physical attack on the coprocessor</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical probing of the coprocessor</td>
<td>The coprocessor electronics incorporate a sophisticated set of active tamper-detection sensors and response mechanism. High and low temperature, voltage levels and sequencing, radiation, and physical penetration sensors are designed to detect unusual environmental situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might perform physical probing of the coprocessor to reveal design information and operational contents. Such probing might include electrical functions but is referred to here as physical since it requires direct contact with the coprocessor internals. Physical probing might entail reading data from the coprocessor through techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse-engineering efforts. The goal of the adversary is to identify such design details as hardware security mechanisms, access-control mechanisms, authentication systems, data-protection systems, memory partitioning, or cryptographic programs. Determination of software design, including initialization data, passwords, PINs, or cryptographic keys might also be a goal.</td>
<td>All of the sensitive electronics are enclosed in a physically shielded package. Upon detecting a potential tamper event, the coprocessor immediately clears all internal RAM memory which also zeroizes keys used to recover sensitive, persistent data from flash memory. An independent state controller is also reset which indicates that the coprocessor is no longer in a factory-certified condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The coprocessor electronics incorporate a sophisticated set of active tamper-detection sensors and response mechanism. High and low temperature, voltage levels and sequencing, radiation, and physical penetration sensors are designed to detect unusual environmental situations.</td>
<td>The coprocessor digitally signs a query response which you can verify to confirm that the coprocessor is genuine and is untampered with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the sensitive electronics are enclosed in a physically shielded package. Upon detecting a potential tamper event, the coprocessor immediately clears all internal RAM memory which also zeroizes keys used to recover sensitive, persistent data from flash memory. An independent state controller is also reset which indicates that the coprocessor is no longer in a factory-certified condition.</td>
<td>The various tamper sensors are powered from the time of coprocessor manufacture through the end of life of the coprocessor. The coprocessor digitally signs a query response which you can verify to confirm that the coprocessor is genuine and is untampered with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The design and implementation is being independently evaluated and certified by the USA NIST under the FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 4 standard.</td>
<td>Note: You must validate the condition of the coprocessor and the code content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note: You must validate the condition of the coprocessor and the code content.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical modification of the coprocessor</strong></td>
<td>The sensitive electronics are all packaged within the tamper-responding package mounted on the coprocessor. In the process of altering the sensitive electronics, the coprocessor factory certification would be destroyed rendering the device useless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might physically modify the coprocessor in order to reveal design or security-related information. This modification might be achieved through techniques commonly employed in hardware failure analysis and reverse-engineering efforts. The goal is to identify such design details as hardware-security mechanisms, access-control mechanisms, authentication systems, data protection systems, memory partitioning, or cryptographic programs. Determination of software design, including initialization data, passwords, or cryptographic keys, might also be a goal.</td>
<td>Note: You will need to physically confirm that a specific, serial-numbered coprocessor is in use and audit its status-query response to confirm that it remains an unaltered IBM coprocessor loaded with appropriate software.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table E-1. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental manipulation of the coprocessor</td>
<td>The coprocessor has sensors to detect environmental stresses which might induce erroneous operation. Abnormal conditions can cause the unit to zeroize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might utilize environmental conditions beyond those of the coprocessor specification to obtain or modify data or program flow for fraudulent coprocessor use. This modification might include manipulation of power lines, clock rates, or exposure to high and low temperatures and radiation. As an effect, the coprocessor might get into a situation where instructions are not correctly executed. As a result, security-critical data might get modified or disclosed in contradiction to the security requirements for the coprocessor.</td>
<td>Notes: 1. Auditors need to complete the processes described for them to ensure that the signing key is indeed retained within the appropriate coprocessor. 2. Access to the host system should be supervised so that host-system security measures and proper operation can be relied upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substituted process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests to, and responses from, the coprocessor might be directed to an alternative implementation enabling an adversary to influence results. An alternative implementation might be substituted with differing security features. For example, private-key generation and the production of digital signatures might be performed in an alternative implementation that would enable exposure of the private key.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insertion of faults</td>
<td>The electronic design of the coprocessor renders classical approaches to smart-card attacks infeasible. Note: Supervision of the host system and controlling access to the system, both logically and physically, are important security steps to be taken by the using organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might determine security critical information through observation of the results of repetitive insertion of selected data. Insertion of selected inputs followed by monitoring the output for changes is a relatively well-known attack method for cryptographic devices. The intent is to determine information based on how the coprocessor responds to the selected inputs. This threat is distinguished by the deliberate and repetitive choice and manipulation of input data as opposed to random selection or manipulation of the physical characteristics involved in input/output operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced reset</td>
<td>The coprocessor is designed to always run through its initial power-on sequence in the event of trap and reset conditions. Each application-level request is treated as a separate unit of work and processed from a single defined set of initial conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might force the coprocessor into a non-secure state through inappropriate termination of selected operations. Attempts to generate a non-secure state in the coprocessor might be made through premature termination of transactions or communications between the coprocessor and the host, by insertion of interrupts, or by inappropriate use of interface functions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table E-1. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invalid input</td>
<td>Transaction requests carry authentication information applied in the caller’s domain and validated by the coprocessor. Each request is processed from a single, known state with predefined conditions. The coprocessor software validates the characteristics of each request to address misuse scenarios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data loading malfunction</td>
<td>Note: As outlined in auditor procedures, the access-control setup should be verified along with confirming the installed coprocessor software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized program loading</td>
<td>The coprocessor will only accept digitally signed software after the signature has been validated. An independent evaluation of IBM’s software build and signing procedures and the coprocessor design affirms the trust which can be placed in the identity of loaded software. Note: An auditor should follow procedures to affirm that specified software is in use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats associated with control of access</td>
<td>An auditor can confirm the permissions granted in each established role and the set of profiles (users) associated with each role. An independent evaluation of the coprocessor software implementation and testing has reviewed the integrity of the access-control implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid access</td>
<td>IBM’s manufacturing and distribution practice ensures that prior to factory certification the end-user of a coprocessor is unknown and unassigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud on first use</td>
<td>Factory-installed software is validated through checking of digital signatures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                                                                                  | Notes:  
1. The standard installation bring-up process replaces all of the runtime coprocessor software.  
2. You should ensure that Segments 2 and 3 are “unowned” prior to loading coprocessor software for production. This ensures that no residual data remains to influence subsequent operations. |
### Table E-1. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impersonation</td>
<td>There are two “user” classes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. (IBM) coprocessor code signer: An independent evaluation of IBM’s procedure for building and signing code assures that legitimate code can be identified by an end-user auditor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The CCA access-control design protects the integrity and confidentiality of an end-user access-control passphrase from the domain of the end-user process into the coprocessor. The correct passphrase and profile identification grant use of a role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Note</strong>: Host-system security, host-system application design, and administrative policies are required to assure that a designated user’s passphrase is secure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Threats associated with unanticipated interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of disallowed application functions</th>
<th>The coprocessor design requires you to configure the access-control setup. The CCA software has been examined to ensure that functions are disallowed when required commands are not enabled.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Notes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Your access-control configuration should follow the principles discussed in Appendix H of the <em>IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors</em> such that only the functions needed for the operational phase can be invoked in this phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. For the digital-signing application, establish guidelines for a set of roles with very limited capabilities and a setup sequence that restricts the coprocessor functionality to that essential to digital signing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In some installations it might be desirable to accommodate a different approach to roles and/or to address additional application(s) functionality. In these cases, ensure that you review the guidelines and observations in Appendix H of the <em>IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors</em> for applicability to your circumstances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Threats regarding cryptographic functions

---

Appendix E. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server E-5
Table E-1. Threat considerations for a digital-signing server (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic attack</td>
<td>The coprocessor implements well-established and standardized cryptographic functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might defeat security functions through a cryptographic attack against the algorithm or through a brute-force attack. This attack might include either signature generation and verification functions or random-number generators.</td>
<td>The random-number generation implementation has been subjected to extensive evaluation under criteria published by the USA NIST and the German Information Security Agency (German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informations Technik or German BSI). The secrecy afforded “retained” private keys is the subject of an independent evaluation. These design and implementation steps provide assurance against cryptographic attack. <strong>Note:</strong> For a digital-signing server, observe the guidelines in Appendix H of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Threats regarding digital signatures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forging signed data</td>
<td>The coprocessor implements well-established and standardized cryptographic functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might modify data digitally signed by the coprocessor such that this modification is not detectable by the signatory nor a third party. This attack might use weaknesses in the secure hash function, weaknesses in the signature encoding, or weaknesses in the cryptographic algorithm used to generate a forged signature.</td>
<td><strong>Notes:</strong> 1. There are precautions in the use of CCA which should be observed as documented in Appendix H of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors. 2. Users should maintain an awareness of vulnerabilities discussed in (open) forums regarding the strength of cryptographic algorithms and processes they employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forging data before it is signed</td>
<td>Requests from user host-application process memory carry an integrity check value which the coprocessor confirms prior to incorporating the hash in a digital signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An adversary might modify data to be digitally signed by the coprocessor before the signature is generated within the coprocessor. This attack might use weaknesses in the implementation that allow an adversary to modify data transmitted for signature to the coprocessor before the coprocessor actually calculates the signature.</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Users must review host-system and host-application program security to ensure that authenticated hash values received into the coprocessor have not been compromised and are representative of the data to be protected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misuse of signature function</td>
<td>An independent review of the coprocessor software is expected to affirm that:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| An adversary might misuse the coprocessor signature creation function to sign data the coprocessor is not supposed to sign. | • The digital-signature generation service requires an appropriate permission in a role  
• The processing of requests and the integrity of the design prevent data alteration  
**Notes:** 1. The integrity of the coprocessor and its code must be affirmed by an auditor who reviews a coprocessor status query. 2. An auditor must confirm that appropriate access-control roles and profiles have been established which exclude unauthorized users from use of the digital-signing functionality. |
### Threat discussion

#### Forging signature-verification function

An adversary might modify the function for signature verification such that a false signature is accepted as valid. This attack might try to modify the signature-verification function or signed data to be verified such that the coprocessor returns a success message when this false signature is presented for verification.

#### Disclosure of a private RSA signature key

An adversary might use a function(s) that discloses a private RSA signature key.

#### Deleting a private RSA signature key

An adversary might use a function that deletes a private RSA signature key without being authorized to do so and without physically tampering with the coprocessor.

### Threat mitigation

The signature-verification function of primary interest here occurs in the coprocessor’s code-loading process (in Miniboot). With this product:

- Miniboot code, like the control program and (CCA) application program code, is only accepted into the coprocessor when the coprocessor validates the signature on the signed code.
- The initial Miniboot code loaded in the factory is also subject to digital-signature verification.
- Standardized cryptographic processes are used (SHA-1, RSA, ISO 9796) for the signature.
- The code building and signing process are the subject of an independent review.

An independent evaluation is expected to affirm that the CCA Support Program does not contain any function to output or reveal the value of a retained private key. Certified evaluations are expected to demonstrate that the control program does not output data retained in coprocessor-persistent storage nor is there any lower-level function to read such storage.

Independent evaluations are expected to affirm that a retained private key is only deleted:

1. Under CCA control with the Retained.Key_Delete verb
2. By loading the coprocessor CCA software*
3. By removing the coprocessor CCA software
4. By causing a tamper event

**Note:** To address these exposures:

1. Selectively enable the Delete Retained Key command, X’0203’
2. Use host-system access controls to manage usage of the CLU Utility
3. Manage physical access to the coprocessor

* Reloading the coprocessor software with a file such as CEXxxxxx.clu does not zeroize the contents of persistent storage. The file CNWxxxxx.clu will zeroize persistent storage. See Chapter 4, “Loading software into the coprocessor.”

### Threats that monitor information

#### Information leakage

An adversary might exploit information that is leaked from the coprocessor during normal usage. Leakage might occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing-time requirements. This leakage might be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which might be derived either from direct (contact) measurements or measurement of emanations and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.

Practical means to interpret information leakage are the subject of ongoing research in commercial and governmental laboratories. An in-depth defense should include limiting access to the cryptographic environment and restrictions on the use of specialized equipment in and near the cryptographic environment.
### Threat discussion

#### Linkage of multiple observations

An adversary might observe multiple uses of resources or services and, by linking these observations, deduce information that would reveal critical security information. The combination of observations over a period of many uses of the coprocessor, or the integration of knowledge gained from observing different operations, might reveal information that allows an adversary to either learn information directly or to formulate an attack that could further reveal information that the coprocessor is required to keep secret.

### Threat mitigation

**Notes:**

1. Usage of the cryptographic equipment should be controlled, including following the guidelines in Appendix H of the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessors.
2. An adversary might well have access to the signed data and signatures, so controls should be put in place to limit a user’s ability to submit arbitrary signing requests.
3. The use of standardized cryptographic procedures and monitoring of the cryptographic community’s understanding of the vulnerabilities of these processes (SHA-1, RSA, ISO 9796, X9.31, HMAC, and triple-DES) can provide assurance of secure operation.

### Miscellaneous threats

#### Linked attacks

An adversary might perform successive attacks with the result that the coprocessor becomes unstable or some aspect of the security functionality is degraded. A following attack might then be successfully executed. Monitoring outputs while manipulating inputs in the presence of environmental stress is an example of a linked attack.

**Notes:**

1. Use of the cryptographic system should be limited to authorized situations enforced through the coprocessor access controls and through use of host-system controls.
2. Host-system controls and organizational policies should restrict the access to the system for monitoring and the submission of arbitrary requests.

#### Repetitive attack

An adversary might utilize repetitive undetected attempts at penetration to expose memory contents or to change security-critical elements in the coprocessor. Repetitive attempts related to some or all of the other threats discussed herein might be used to iteratively develop an effective penetration of the coprocessor security. If these attacks can, in all cases, remain undetected, there will be no warning of increased vulnerability.

**Note:** Use of the cryptographic system should be limited to authorized situations enforced through the coprocessor access controls and through use of host-system controls. Host-system controls and organizational policies should restrict the access to the system for monitoring and the submission of arbitrary requests.

#### Cloning

An adversary might clone part or all of a functional coprocessor to develop further attacks. The information necessary to successfully clone part or all of a coprocessor might derive from detailed inspection of the coprocessor itself or from illicit appropriation of design information.

**Note:** Auditors must confirm that the digital-signing key, appropriate code, and access-control regime is resident in the authorized coprocessor.

### Threats addressed by the operating environment

#### Coprocessor modification and reuse

An adversary might use a modified coprocessor to masquerade as an original coprocessor so that information assets can be fraudulently accessed. Removal, modification, and re-insertion of that coprocessor into a host system could be used to pass such a combination as an original. This might then be used to access or change the private-signature keys or other security-critical information to be protected.

**Notes:**

1. An auditor must confirm through examination of a coprocessor-signed query response that the device is genuine and that the appropriate code is loaded.
2. The auditor must also confirm that the digital-signing key is a “retained” key in the coprocessor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat discussion</th>
<th>Threat mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abuse by privileged users</strong></td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> An organization must establish, enforce, and audit policies which limit the access that a single individual has to the cryptographic system. The setup procedure must ensure that a single user does not have the opportunity to bring an inappropriate system into production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A careless, willfully negligent, or hostile administrator or other privileged user might create a compromise of the coprocessor assets through execution of actions which expose the security functions or the protected data. A privileged user or administrator could directly implement or facilitate attacks based on any of the threats described here.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data modification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Host-system security precautions and organization policies must be defined, enforced, and audited to thwart such attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data to be signed by the coprocessor might be modified by an adversary or by faults in the operational environment after it has been approved by the legitimate user, but before the data is submitted to the coprocessor to be signed. Data that has been approved by the legitimate user to be signed might be modified by an adversary, by false or malicious programs, or by environmental errors (for example, transmission errors) after the data has been approved by the legitimate user and before the data is transferred to the coprocessor to be signed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data verification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Host-system security measures must address blocking the modification of request inputs and outputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed data to be verified by the coprocessor might be modified by an adversary or by faults in the operational environment before it is submitted to the coprocessor for signature verification such that the response of the coprocessor does not reflect the validity of the signature. Signed data submitted by a user might be modified within the coprocessor environment before it is passed to the coprocessor for verification. This might result in a response from the coprocessor that does not reflect the actual validity of the digital signature that should be verified. There is also the possibility that the response of the coprocessor is modified in the coprocessor environment before it is passed to the user that requested the signature verification.</td>
<td>The coprocessor verifies the signature on code and certain code-loading commands. An independent evaluation is expected to confirm that this cannot be bypassed. The CCA design supports validation of the integrity of requests and responses between the coprocessor and the top layer of CCA code in the host system. <strong>Note:</strong> Host-system security measures must address blocking the modification of request inputs and outputs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F. Notices

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For Taiwan: Please recycle batteries.
IBM Cryptographic Coprocessor card return program

This machine may contain an optional feature, the cryptographic coprocessor card which includes a polyurethane material that contains mercury. Please follow Local Ordinances or regulations for disposal of this card. IBM has established a return program for certain IBM Cryptographic Coprocessor cards. More information can be found at:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSI</td>
<td>American National Standards Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Application Programming Interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCII</td>
<td>American National Standard Code for Information Interchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Celsius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Certification Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cipher Block Chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Cryptographic Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDMF</td>
<td>Commercial Data Masking Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLU</td>
<td>Coprocessor Load Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>CCA Cryptographic Node Initialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNM</td>
<td>CCA Cryptographic Node Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Data Encryption Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Direct Memory Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Electronic Codebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPROM</td>
<td>Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCV</td>
<td>Function-Control Vector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPS</td>
<td>Federal Information Processing Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTP</td>
<td>File Transfer Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSF</td>
<td>Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Input/Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPL</td>
<td>Initial Program Load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEK</td>
<td>Key-Encrypting Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Message Authentication Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Modification Detection Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSP</td>
<td>Online Certificate Status Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Personal Computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Peripheral Component Interconnect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI-X</td>
<td>Peripheral Component Interconnect Extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Physical Device Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Portable Document Format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>Personal Identification Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKA</td>
<td>Public-Key Algorithm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>power-on self-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>registration authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>random access memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>rivest, shamir, and adleman (algorithm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>share administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>secure hashing algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKA</td>
<td>secret key authentication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

This glossary includes some terms and definitions from the IBM Dictionary of Computing, New York: McGraw Hill, 1994. This glossary also includes some terms and definitions taken from:

- The American National Standard Dictionary for Information Systems, ANSI X3.172-1990, copyright 1990 by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Copies might be purchased from the American National Standards Institute, 11 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036. Definitions are identified by the symbol (A) following the definition.

- The Information Technology Vocabulary, developed by Subcommittee 1, Joint Technical Committee 1, of the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC JTC1/SC1). Definitions of published parts of this vocabulary are identified by the symbol (I) following the definition; definitions taken from draft international standards, committee drafts, and working papers being developed by ISO/IEC JTC1/SC1 are identified by the symbol (T) following the definition, indicating that final agreement has not yet been reached among the participating National Bodies of SC1.

A

access. In computer security, a specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that results in the flow of information from one to the other.

access control. Ensuring that the resources of a computer system can be accessed only by authorized users and in authorized ways.

access method. A technique for moving data between main storage and input/output devices.

American National Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII). The standard code, using a coded character set consisting of seven-bit characters (eight bits including parity check), that is used for information interchange among data processing systems, data communication systems, and associated equipment. The ASCII set consists of control characters and graphic characters. (A)

American National Standards Institute (ANSI). An organization consisting of producers, consumers, and general interest groups that establishes the procedures by which accredited organizations create and maintain voluntary industry standards for the United States. (A)

Application program interface (API). A functional interface supplies by the operating system or by a separate program that allows an application program written in a high-level language to use specific data or functions of the operating system or the separate program.

authentication. A process used to verify the integrity of transmitted data, especially a message. (T) In computer security, a process used to verify the user of an information system or protected resource.

authorization. In computer security, the right granted to a user to communicate with or make use of a computer system. (T) The process of granting a user either complete or restricted access to an object, resource, or function.

authorize. To permit or give authority to a user to communicate with or make use of an object, resource, or function.

Authorized program facility (APF). A facility that permits identification of programs authorized to use restricted functions.

B

bus. In a processor, a physical facility along which data is transferred.

C

card. An electronic circuit board that is plugged into an expansion slot of a system unit. A plug-in circuit assembly.

CDMF algorithm. An algorithm for data confidentiality applications; it is based on the DES algorithm and possesses 40-bit key strength.

ciphertext. Text that results from the encipherment of plaintext. See also plaintext.

cipher block chain (CBC). A mode of operation that cryptographically connects one block of ciphertext to the next plaintext block.

cleartext. Text that has not been altered by a cryptographic process. Synonym for plaintext. See also ciphertext.

Common cryptographic architecture (CCA) API. The application program interface described in the IBM CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide, SC31-8609.

coprocessor. A supplementary processor that performs operations in conjunction with another
processor. A microprocessor on an expansion card that extends the address range of the processor in the host system, or adds specialized instructions to handle a particular category of operations; for example, an I/O coprocessor, math coprocessor, or a network coprocessor.

cryptographic coprocessor (IBM 4764). An expansion board that provides to a server a comprehensive set of cryptographic functions.

cryptographic node. A node that provides cryptographic services, such as key generation and digital signature support.

cryptography. The transformation of data to conceal its meaning. In computer security, the principles, means, and methods used to so transform data.

data encrypting key. A key used to encipher, decipher, or authenticate data. Contrast with key encrypting key.

data encryption algorithm (DEA). A 64-bit block cipher that uses a 64-bit key, of which 56 bits are used to control the cryptographic process and eight bits are used to check parity.


decipher. To convert enciphered data into clear data. Contrast with encipher.

direct memory access (DMA). The transfer of data between memory and input/output units without processor intervention.

driver. A program that contains the code needed to attach and use a device.

electronic codebook (ECB). A mode of operation used with block-cipher cryptographic algorithms in which plaintext or ciphertext is placed in the input to the algorithm and the result is contained in the output of the algorithm.

encipher. To scramble data or to convert data to a secret code that masks the meaning of the data. Contrast with decipher.

enciphered data. Data whose meaning is concealed from unauthorized users or observers. See also ciphertext.

expansion board. Synonym for expansion card.

expansion card. A circuit board that a user can install in an expansion slot to add memory or special features to a computer. Synonym for card.

exporter key. In the CCA, a type of DES KEK that can encipher a key at a sending node. Contrast with importer key.

feature. A part of an IBM product that can be ordered separately.

federal information processing standard (FIPS). A standard that is published by the US National Institute of Science and Technology.

flash EPROM. A specialized version of erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM) commonly used to store code in small computers.

function-control vector. A signed value provided by IBM to enable the CCA application in the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor to yield a level of cryptographic service consistent with applicable export-and-import regulations.

host computer. In regard to the CCA Cryptographic Coprocessor Support Program, the server into which the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor is installed.

importer key. In CCA products, a type of DES KEK that can decipher a key at a receiving node. Contrast with exporter key.

inline code. In a program, instructions that are executed sequentially, without branching to routines, subroutines, or other programs.

interface. A boundary shared by two functional units, as defined by functional characteristics, signal characteristics, or other characteristics as appropriate. The concept includes specification of the connection between two devices having different functions. (T) Hardware, software, or both, that links systems, programs, and devices.

international organization for standardization (ISO). An organization of national standards bodies established to promote the development of standards to facilitate the international exchange of goods and services, and to foster cooperation in intellectual, scientific, technological, and economic activity.
key. In computer security, a sequence of symbols used with an algorithm to encipher or decipher data.

key encrypting key (KEK). A key used to cipher and decipher other keys. Contrast with data encrypting key.

key storage. In CCA products, a data file that contains cryptographic keys.

master key. In the 4764’s CCA implementation, the key used to encrypt keys to process other keys or data at the node.

message authentication code (MAC). In computer security, (1) a number or value derived by processing data with an authentication algorithm, (2) the cryptographic result of block-cipher operations on text or data using the cipher block chain (CBC) mode of operation.

multi-user environment. A computer system that supports terminals and keyboards for more than one user at the same time.

national institute of science and technology (NIST). Current name for the US National Bureau of Standards.

node. In a network, a point at which one or more functional units connects channels or data circuits. (I) The endpoint of a link or a junction common to two or more links in a network. Nodes can be processors, communication controllers, cluster controllers, or terminals. Nodes can vary in routing and other functional capabilities.

passphrase. In computer security, a string of characters known to the computer system and to a user; the user must specify it to gain full or limited access to the system and the data stored therein.

plaintext. Data that has not been altered by a cryptographic process. Synonym for cleartext. See also ciphertext.

power on self test (POST). A series of diagnostic tests that runs automatically when device power is turned on.

private key. In computer security, a key that is known only to the owner and used with a public key algorithm to decipher data. Data is enciphered using the related public key. Contrast with public key. See also public key algorithm.

procedure call. In programming languages, a language construct for invoking execution of a procedure. (I) A procedure call usually includes an entry name and the applicable parameters.

profile. Data that describes the significant characteristics of a user, a group of users, or one-or-more computer resources.

public key. In computer security, a key that is widely known and used with a public key algorithm to encipher data. The enciphered data can be deciphered only with the related private key. Contrast with private key. See also public key algorithm.

public key algorithm (PKA). In computer security, an asymmetric cryptographic process that uses a public key to encipher data and a related private key to decipher data. Contrast with data encryption algorithm and data encryption standard algorithm. See also RSA algorithm.

random access memory (RAM). A storage device into which data is entered and from which data is retrieved in a non-sequential manner.

read only memory (ROM). Memory in which stored data cannot be modified routinely.

RSA algorithm. A public key encryption algorithm developed by R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman.

secret key authentication (SKA) certificate. The SKA certificate contains enciphered values that could allow IBM to re-initialize a coprocessor after its tamper-sensors have been triggered. Without a copy of the certificate, there is no way to recover the coprocessor.

security. The protection of data, system operations, and devices from accidental or intentional ruin, damage, or exposure.

system administrator. The person at a computer installation who designs, controls, and manages the use of the computer system.

throughput. A measure of the amount of work performed by a computer system over a given period of time; for example, number of jobs-per-day. (A) (I) A measure of the amount of information transmitted over a
network in a given period of time; for example, a network's data-transfer-rate is usually measured in bits-per-second.

**U**

utility program. A computer program in general support of computer processes. (T)

**V**

verb. A function possessing an entry-point name and a fixed-length parameter list. The procedure call for a verb uses the syntax standard to programming languages.

**Numerics**

4764. IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor.
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